- It is sometimes said that there are two theories of identity across time. First, there is "three-dimensionalism," according to which persisting objects are extended in the three spatial dimensions and have no other kind of extent and persist by "enduring through time" (whatever exactly that means). Secondly, there is "four-dimensionalism," according to which persisting objects are extended not only in the three spatial dimensions, but also in a fourth, temporal, dimension, and persist simply by being temporally extended.
- In this paper, I shall argue that there are not two but three possible theories of identity across time, and I shall endorse one of them, a theory that may, as a first approximation, be identified with what I have called "three-dimensionalism." I shall present these three theories as theories about the ways in which our names for persisting objects are related to the occupants (or the alleged occupants) of certain regions of spacetime.
- Included in "Look (Brandon C.) - The Metaphysics of Material Beings: Constitution, Persistence, and Identity",
- Also in "Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings".
- Also in "Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Identity",
- Originally, Nous, 24 (1990), pp. 245–255;
- also in "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Ontology, Identity and Modality: Essays in metaphysics".
- Printout filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 18 (T-V)"
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