Vague Identity
Rasmussen (Stig Alstrup)
Source: Mind 95.377, Jan. 1986, pp. 81-91
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer


Philosophers Index Abstract

    Gareth evans and nathan salmon have propounded different versions of an argument to the effect that there cannot be vague objects, since otherwise leibniz's law1 would lack universal validity. It is argued that all versions of that argument fail: either no contradiction is forthcoming, or the argument will not take off at all. In addition, various suggestions relating to the argument put forth by h noonan, r thomason, and p gibbins are discussed.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Dec 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page