On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be
Stalnaker (Robert)
Source: Stalnaker - Ways a World Might Be, Chapter 2
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. This paper explores the analogy between mathematical Platonism and modal1 realism, and between Benacerraf's dilemma and the epistemological objection.
  2. It is argued that the parallels and contrasts may clarify both modal2 realism and the general problem of model epistemology.
  3. The paper begins with a sketch of Benacerraf's reasons for thinking that there is a prima facie conflict between a straightforward account of mathematical truth and a reasonable account of mathematical knowledge.
  4. It then develops presents a strategy to respond to the dilemma, and argues that this does not suggest a parallel response to the epistemological objection to modal3 realism.
  5. Finally, a more general problem for an epistemology of necessary truth is examined.


Part I - Ways and Worlds

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