Counterparts and Identity
Stalnaker (Robert)
Source: Stalnaker - Ways a World Might Be, Chapter 6
Paper - Abstract

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Philosopher’s Index Abstract

  1. This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive thisness1 and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version of counterpart theory that permits one to make sense of contingent identity2 and distinctness, i.e., if the claims that one thing might have been two, and that distinct things might have been identical.
  2. The thesis called haecceitism is analysed, and it is argued that this doctrine can be reconciled with a version of counterpart theory, and with the coherence of contingent identity3.
  3. The impact of this account of counterparts and identity on the abstract semantics of quantified modal logic4 is considered.

Sections
  1. Introduction
  2. Counterpart Theory
  3. Actualism and Merely Possible Individuals
  4. Haecceitism and Absolute Identity
  5. Worlds and Times
  6. Variable Binding

Comment:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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