Qualitative Change and the Doctrine Of Temporal Parts
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics, Chapter 3
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. In Chapter 3, I turn to the question of whether, and if so how, a thing can retain its identity over time while undergoing a change of its intrinsic qualities — the so-called problem of intrinsic change.
  2. Here I explain and evaluate the doctrine of temporal parts, which offers one solution to this problem.

  1. Leibniz's Law2 and the problem of qualitative change – 41
  2. Presentism – 42
  3. Three temporal realist solutions to the problem – 43
  4. A clarification of the adverbial solution – 47
  5. Perdurance3 versus endurance – 49
  6. The notion of temporal parts – 50
  7. A problem for perdurance4 theories – 54
  8. Temporal parts as theoretical entities – 55

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Lowe (E.J.) - Introduction: The Nature of Metaphysics".

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