Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics, Chapter 4
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. In Chapter 4, I look at the question of whether our concept of identity should be a relative or an absolute one, in the course of discussing how we can best conceptualize cases of so-called substantial change — for example, the case of a statue2 being formed from a lump of bronze.
  2. Should we allow that two different things, such as the statue3 and its constituent bronze, can exist in exactly the same place at the same time? How indeed, if at all, does the relation of constitution differ from the relation of identity?

Sections
  1. Beginning and ceasing to exist – 59
  2. Can there be coinciding objects? – 61
  3. Relative versus absolute identity – 62
  4. Temporal parts and coinciding objects – 65
  5. Some radical solutions to the problem of coincidence – 66
  6. In defence of coinciding objects – 68
  7. Identity and constitution – 73
  8. The problem of Tibbles4 and Tib – 74



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Lowe (E.J.) - Introduction: The Nature of Metaphysics".


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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