Necessity and Identity
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics, Chapter 5
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. Chapters 5 to 7 concern the metaphysics of modality2, that is, metaphysical issues to do with possibility and necessity.
  2. In Chapter 5, after considering some analogies between time and modality3, I look at a well-known attempt to prove that true identity statements are necessarily true and raise some possible objections to this alleged proof. I also examine some of its supposed metaphysical implications, in particular its bearing upon the mind-body problem.

  1. Two kinds of possibility – 79
  2. Possibility as a dimension of variation – 80
  3. Possible worlds – 81
  4. Necessary truths and necessary beings – 82
  5. An argument for the necessity of identity – 84
  6. Some objections to the argument – 86
  7. Rigid designators – 89
  8. Transworld identity – 90
  9. Could two objects have been one? – 91
  10. The necessity of identity and the mind-body problem – 92

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Lowe (E.J.) - Introduction: The Nature of Metaphysics".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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