Personal Identity (S&S)
Wiggins (David)
Source: Wiggins - Sameness and Substance, 1980, Chapter 6
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperText Colour-Conventions


Chapter Breakdown1

  1. John Locke on persons - 149
  2. An objection of Joseph Butler: the charge of circularity - 152
  3. Another line of objection, and the requirement of continuity of consciousness restated to counter the charge of absurdity - 154
  4. The inadequacy of Ip, as of any pure or physicalistically uncontaminated ‘remembering’ condition of mental continuity. The involvement of remembering with the physical - 155
  5. The charge of circularity rephrased and reconsidered as a charge of non-effectiveness - 160
  6. Two senses in which a person may be supposed to transcend his body, one correct, the other impossible - 163
  7. Real possibility: the limits of personhood - 169
  8. The limits of personhood continued: and a formal difference between the vegetable and person concepts - 173
  9. Amnesia reconsidered, and man as an animal - 176
  10. Persons as social constructs and persons as given - 179
  11. Nature and naturalism - 182
  12. Conclusion: the abandonment of the *C condition: a small amendment to Locke; and an inconclusive postscript on the brain - 187



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - November 2017. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page