Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts

Chapter Breakdown₁

• PART ONE
  1. An expeditious if precipitate answer to the question of personal identity - 193
  2. Doubts, and answers to doubts: subjects of consciousness - 194
  3. The Lockean conception; and Butler's criticisms of such conceptions - 197
  4. A neo-Lockean identity-condition - 200
  5. Butler's central insight - 203
  6. A neo-Lockean conception - 205
  7. Unfinished business - 208
  8. The theses to be argued in this chapter - 211
  9. Co-consciousness again, and quasi-memory² - 212
  10. A second and third question about Parfit’s³ definition of ‘Q-remember’ - 214
  11. Digression: an alternative method of definition, revealing by its inadequacy the semantical point of the attribution of experiential memory - 217
  12. More about ‘dependent in the right way’ – 222
• PART TWO
  13. As it now appears, the state of the whole argument to date - 225
  14. Participation in the growth of knowledge - 227
  15. The penultimate problem and a verdict upon it, all leading in due course to a reassessment of the original Shoemaker case - 231
  16. Brown-Brownson reconsidered - 232
  17. One last variant — and the philosophical moral of same. Finally, human persons as artefacts? - 236