<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3507.htm">Psychology and Personal Identity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Olson (Eric)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 1, pp. 7-21</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3507.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperCitings_3507.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PapersToNotes_3507.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Most philosophers agree that some sort of <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>1</SUP> is necessary or sufficient for us to persist  the Psychological Approach to personal identity. </li><li>Some implications of this view are sketched. </li><li>The Biological Approach, by contrast, says that our identity, over time, consists in brute biological continuity. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>Human Vegetables and <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Cerebrum Transplants</A><SUP>2</SUP></li><li>The Psychological Approach</li><li>The Biological Approach</li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_3">Annotations</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_3"></A></u><BR><ol type="I"><li><b>Human Vegetables and <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Cerebrum Transplants</A><SUP>4</SUP></b><ul type="disc"><li>Olson wants to consider  our identity over time, without at this stage deciding what  we are. </li><li>To do this, he will consider some  puzzle cases (ie. <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TEs</A><SUP>5</SUP>). <ol type="A"><li>The first is the  Vegetable Case (ie. <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_111.htm">PVS</A><SUP>6</SUP>). <ul type="square"><li>The cells in the cerebral cortex have died of anoxia. Claims: <ol type="i"><li>Brain cells don t regenerate; </li><li>Consciousness and thought are cortex-based, so are irretrievably lost. </li><li>So  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_7">you</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_7"></A> are irretrievably non-cognitive. </li></ol></li><li>However, the parts of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_8">brain</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_8"></A> (thalamus, basal ganglia, cerebellum, brain-stem) that support your vegetative functions are more resistant to oxygen starvation and might survive intact. </li><li>Olson mentions Karen Quinlan (<a name="W2288W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karen_Ann_Quinlan" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>), who continued in a PVS for 10 years <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_9">after</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_9"></A> her respirator was switched off.</li><li>Olson claims that the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_10">entity</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_10"></A> in a PVS is  a <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>11</SUP> as much like you as anything could be without having a mind . </li><li>The <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>12</SUP> in a PVS is not in a coma but  is awake but unaware ;  the lights are on, but no-one s at home . Various reflexes remain, but there s no behavioral <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_13">responsiveness</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_13"></A>. </li><li>Nor is the animal brain-dead  what Olson describes as a  ventilated <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_14">corpse</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_14"></A>  because the brain still performs its regulative functions. The patient is alive in the sense that  oak trees and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_15">oysters</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_15"></A> are alive .</li><li>Olson admits there is room for doubt as to whether in a PVS you have really lost all cognitive function, and that the loss is permanent  though this is the medical consensus. But this is effectively a TE, so <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_16">for the sake of the argument</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_16"></A> we assume that both these assumptions are correct. </li><li>There are lots of ethical questions about what to do with individuals in a PVS, but these aren t Olson s concern here. Rather, he wants to know what happened to  you in this story. He doesn t care about lots of legal issues, or quality-of-life issues either. All he wants to know is whether  you are still there in that pathetic state. Has your existence been brought to an end as in ordinary cases of death, or have you survived?</li><li>Olson considers the case where you die and are cremated, and a memorial statue is erected in your honour. Now, you are not that statue. If you had said that one day you would be that statue, you would have made a false statement in a way that is not so obviously false in the case of the PVS-individual. Whereas in the first case you have been clearly replaced by something else, has this happened in the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_17">PVS-case</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_17"></A>? </li></ul></li><li>We now move on to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_18">second TE</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_18"></A>  <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Cerebrum Transplants</A><SUP>19</SUP>. <ul type="square"><li>Olson refers to  that organ (which is most responsible for your higher cognitive functions), so is presumably thinking of both hemispheres at this stage. The supposition is that the technical wiring difficulties can be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_20">overcome</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_20"></A>, so that  it is able to function properly inside its new head just as it once functioned inside yours . </li><li>Olson assumes various things about the <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">post-transplant</A><SUP>21</SUP> recipient of your <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>22</SUP>:- <ol type="1"><li>She is a <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">human being</A><SUP>23</SUP>, & </li><li>Psychologically more or less exactly like you, </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_24">Appears</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_24"></A> to remember your past, </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_25">Apparently</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_25"></A> acts on your intentions,</li><li>May be physically very unlike you,</li><li>Initially, her personality, tastes and affections are just like yours,</li><li>She <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_26">thinks</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_26"></A> she is you, </li><li>She does not <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_27">remember</A></U><SUB>27</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_27"></A> anything that happened to the person into whose head the <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>28</SUP> was implanted, nor does she <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_29">initially</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_29"></A> acquire any of that person s character. </li></ol></li><li>What about the <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>30</SUP> donor? Olson correctly adduces evidence from the survival of PVS-victims, anencephalics (<a name="W2289W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anencephaly" TARGET = "_top">Wikipedia: Anencephaly</A>) and <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">single-cerebrum</A><SUP>31</SUP> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_32">excision</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_32"></A> to show that the donor would remain a living, but irreversibly non-cognitive, <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>33</SUP> whose biological functions continue as before. </li><li>In a footnote, Olson admits that <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum-transplants</A><SUP>34</SUP> are science fiction, and their possibility might be questioned. However, he thinks there are no <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_35">further</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_35"></A> difficulties than for <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBTs</A><SUP>36</SUP>, and adduces the following in support of the theoretical possibility of the latter:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="165"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6028.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Brain Transplants and Personal Identity</A>", </li><li><a name="166"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2637.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants</A>" (pp. 114-7), and</li><li><a name="167"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3666.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Thought Experiments</A>", p. 37.</li></ol></li><li>Olson asks what has become of <u>you</u> in the  <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplant</A><SUP>37</SUP> Case ? He <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_38">only</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_38"></A> considers 3 possibilities:- <ol type="1"><li>You are the donor, or</li><li>You  go along with your <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>39</SUP>, or</li><li>You <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_40">cease</A></U><SUB>40</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_40"></A> to exist. </li></ol></li><li>The key question Olson asks is whether one of your <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_41">organs</A></U><SUB>41</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_41"></A> has been <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</A><SUP>42</SUP> (as a liver might have been) leaving you in situ, or whether you have been pared down to a <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>43</SUP> and rehoused, the surgeon grafting the rest of the recipient s body (and brain) onto you. Olson s answer will no doubt <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_44">appear later on</A></U><SUB>44</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_44"></A>. </li></ul></ol> </li></ul></li><li><b>The Psychological Approach </b><ul type="disc"><li>Olson sees two sorts of considerations that might answer questions of personal identity raised by the puzzle cases:- <ol type="1"><li>Phychological continuity, and </li><li>Biological continuity </li></ol></li><li>He gives the usual arguments that you are psychologically continuous with the <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>45</SUP> recipient, but not the PVS-victim, or the <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>46</SUP> donor.</li><li>But you are biologically-related to the PVS-victim, and to the <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>47</SUP> donor, who each preserve your biological <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_48">life</A></U><SUB>48</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_48"></A>. </li><li>We are referred to Chapter 2 (<a name="168"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>"), Section II ( <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Whole-Brain Transplants )</A><SUP>49</SUP>, for why a <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBT</A><SUP>50</SUP> is entirely different to a CT. In the case of a CT, the recipient does <u>not</u> receive your life-sustaining functions, but  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_51">just an organ</A></U><SUB>51</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_51"></A> . From the biological perspective, <a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanting a cerebrum</A><SUP>52</SUP> is no different to <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanting</A><SUP>53</SUP> a kidney, or any other organ you could live without.</li><li>Olson claims there is no biological continuity between you and the <a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>54</SUP> recipient, but this seems to me to go too <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_55">far</A></U><SUB>55</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_55"></A>.</li><li>Olson thinks these two sorts of continuity have not received equal attention, with the case defaulting to the PV. Biology is deemed irrelevant, with nothing continuing in either the PVS case or on the donor-side of the <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>56</SUP> case being <u>you</u>. Olson cites <a name="169"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", p. 11, as describing this view as  scientifically-educated common sense . </li><li>However, a footnote gives other equally-scientifically-educated dissenting views. <a name="170"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3955.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke on Living Things</A>", p. 224, claims not only that you could survive the destruction of your mind but that you would continue to exist as a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_57">corpse</A></U><SUB>57</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_57"></A>. Olson also cites <a name="171"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4924.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Philosophers and the Words 'Human Body'</A>", p. 295. </li><li>So, most philosophers adopt the <em>Psychological Approach</em>, whereby one survives if one s mind does. Olson quotes <a name="172"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", p. 77 to the effect that it s a <em><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_58">conceptual truth</A></U><SUB>58</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_58"></A></em> that a person cannot be outlived by what was once his mind. </li><li>Olson seems to agree that the TEs show that biological and <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>59</SUP> can <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_60">come apart</A></U><SUB>60</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_60"></A>. </li><li>While biological continuity is usually good <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_61">evidence</A></U><SUB>61</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_61"></A> for one s survival, it is not what that survival consists in, according to & </li><li>The <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_62">Psychological Approach</A></U><SUB>62</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_62"></A>, which claims that some  interesting connections between psychological states are both necessary and sufficient for my persistence. Roughly speaking, any past or future being that has <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_63">my mind</A></U><SUB>63</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_63"></A> is me. </li><li>The traditional problem of PID is  on the assumption that the PV is correct  just which version of it is the right one. What are these psychological connections? Olson will go on to consider versions that give priority to mental <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_64">contents</A></U><SUB>64</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_64"></A>, and those that focus on mental <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_65">capacities</A></U><SUB>65</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_65"></A> before considering whether any <a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_15.htm">physical continuity</A><SUP>66</SUP> is also considered necessary. </li><li><b>Mental Contents</b>: <ul type="square"><li>These are memories, beliefs, desires and the like. Mental contents at a later time are continuous with those at an earlier time if they are caused by them. If there are enough of these connections, then the possessor of the later contents is the same person as the possessor of the earlier set. </li><li>Olson has a couple of footnotes at this point:- <ol type="i"><li>He cites <a name="274"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>", p. 206 (ie. <a name="173"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3572.htm">Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be</A>") as an example of those who take (something like) this causal relation as constitutive of <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>67</SUP>. Olson, however,  uses the term more broadly , but doesn t (here) explain how. He also  pretends that the relation is symmetric, claiming that it would be a simple but tedious exercise to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_68">eliminate the pretension</A></U><SUB>68</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_68"></A>. </li><li>Olson points out that even opponents of the PV agree that it s analytic (from the meaning of  memory ) that if I remember the deeds of some past person, then I am that person. He therefore introduces the concept of <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_897.htm">quasi-memory</A><SUP>69</SUP>, which is just like memory but does not presuppose identity, only appropriate <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>70</SUP>. We are referred to <BR>&rarr; <a name="174"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>", <BR>&rarr; <a name="275"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_150.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) & Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity</A>" (Chapter 4  ie. <a name="175"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3703.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Reply to Swinburne</A>"), and <BR>&rarr; <a name="276"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>" (Chapter 8  ie <a name="176"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3970.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Quasi-Memory</A>") </li></ol></li><li>We re referred to <a name="177"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15846.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity</A>" for  an interesting variation on the traditional account of the continuity of mental contents . </li><li>We would have to allow that I can be some past person at a time even if I remember nothing of that time. Even if I can t remember what happened at time x, I can remember a time when I <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_71">could</A></U><SUB>71</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_71"></A>. </li><li>There are periods of my existence  for instance of dreamless sleep  of which I have never had any memories. However, Olson concedes that I (presumably) retained my unconscious intentions when asleep. Consequently he agrees that there are overlapping chains of mental contents that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_72">connect</A></U><SUB>72</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_72"></A> me to this past person. </li><li>However, according to the PV, one cannot survive  total oblivion (maybe as the result of degenerative brain damage) whereby your past memories and intentions are destroyed (rather than merely inaccessible or garbled)  no therapy can recover them. This is in spite of the fact that the residual being might still be conscious and rational, with many residual abilities. His mind is discontinuous with yours, so you have ceased to exist and have been replaced by a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_73">numerically different being</A></U><SUB>73</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_73"></A>. </li><li>A footnote adds realism to this scenario  similar to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_74">Korsakoff s syndrome</A></U><SUB>74</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_74"></A>. We are referred to <BR>&rarr; <a name="277"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_253.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat</A>", sections 2 & 12 (ie. <a name="178"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8095.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - The Lost Mariner</A>" & <a name="179"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8105.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - A Matter of Identity</A>"), <BR>&rarr; <a name="180"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5402.htm">Perry (John) - Review of Bernard Williams' 'Problems of the Self'</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_75">p. 421</A></U><SUB>75</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_75"></A> and<BR>&rarr; <a name="278"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_49.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings</A>", p. 183 (ie. <a name="181"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3548.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Two Problems About Personal Identity: Memory and Commissurotomy</A>"). </li></ul></li><li><b>Mental Capacities</b>: <ul type="square"><li>Those who support this view point out that even if all memories and other mental contents are wiped out, there might still be <a name="36"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>76</SUP> based on mental capacities  your (now contentless) mind has not been destroyed. </li><li>Olson quotes <a name="279"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_77">p. 116</A></U><SUB>77</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_77"></A>, though it looks to me as though this is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_78">not the focus</A></U><SUB>78</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_78"></A> of Unger s claim. However, he thinks <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_79">various others share this view</A></U><SUB>79</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_79"></A>. </li><li>Olson thinks  correctly in my view  that this distinction between contents and capacities may be a red herring, in that without any content, all my capacities might vanish. </li></ul></li><li><b>Physical Continuity</b>: <ul type="square"><li>Advocates of the PV differ on whether any <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_80">material</A></U><SUB>80</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_80"></A> continuity is required:- <ol type="i"><li>Some insist that you survive only if (enough of) your <a name="37"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>81</SUP> survives so as to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_82">support conscious, rational thought</A></U><SUB>82</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_82"></A>. </li><li>Others only require some physical structure spatio-temporally continuous with your <a name="38"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>83</SUP> as the realizer of your mental capacities. </li></ol></li><li>Alternatively, consider a brain zap alloyed to the transfer of information  in an  unspecified but reliable way  to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_84">remote recipient brain</A></U><SUB>84</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_84"></A>. Some philosophers think that person, who thinks she s you and (quasi-)remembers your experiences <u>is</u> you, even though there s no material continuity and a period mid-transfer when your mental contents and capacities were nowhere physically realized in a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_85">functioning organ of thought</A></U><SUB>85</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_85"></A>. Supporters of the material continuity requirement would deny this. </li><li>Olson considers two reduplication objections, which he thinks show that <a name="39"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>86</SUP> is insufficient for <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_87">survival</A></U><SUB>87</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_87"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>The brain-state transfer can be repeated into multiple recipient brains, which the material-continuity view would say are you  but <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_88">they can t all be</A></U><SUB>88</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_88"></A>. </li><li>Even if the <a name="40"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum is transplanted</A><SUP>89</SUP>, we could <a name="41"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>90</SUP> each one into a different brain, with duplication again. This case is considered inn <a name="182"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>", Section 3 ( Fission and Hemispherectomy ). </li></ol></li></ul></li><li>Reduplication objections encourage supporters of the PV to add a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_91">Uniqueness Condition</A></U><SUB>91</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_91"></A>. </li><li>Thus, the PV represents a wide spectrum of opinions that agree that some sort of mental continuity is necessary for our persistence, with some rider like uniqueness or material continuity to provide <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_92">sufficiency</A></U><SUB>92</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_92"></A>. </li><li>When Olson subsequently refers to the PV, he ll not specify <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_93">which of these variants he has in mind</A></U><SUB>93</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_93"></A>. The reader is asked to substitute his preferred version. </li></ul></li><li><b>The Biological Approach </b><ul type="disc"><li>The claim of this book is that the PV is false  or at least in serious difficulties  and that <a name="42"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>94</SUP> is neither necessary nor sufficient for us to survive. He argues for this claim in Chapters 4 & 5, ie. in <BR>&rarr; <a name="183"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A>", and<BR>&rarr; <a name="184"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3511.htm">Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?</A>"</li><li>In place of the PV, Olson will adopt a radically non-psychological account of our identity, involving biological continuity  one survives just in case one s purely animal functions continue. Biology replaces psychology. </li><li><b>The Two Claims of the Biological Approach</b>: <ol type="i"><li>We are animals, members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em>. <ul type="square"><li>Olson mentions his debt to <a name="185"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2637.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants</A>" for pointing this out!</li><li>Olson <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_95">doesn t claim that all</A></U><SUB>95</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_95"></A> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_96">persons</A></U><SUB>96</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_96"></A> are <a name="43"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>97</SUP>. For all he knows there might be (rational and conscious)  organisms of other species, & Martians, gods, angels, & computers who <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_98">qualify</A></U><SUB>98</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_98"></A> as persons. </li><li>But, all <a name="44"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_75.htm">human persons</A><SUP>99</SUP> are <a name="45"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_30.htm">animals</A><SUP>100</SUP>. </li><li>We are what <a name="46"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_83.htm">Locke</A><SUP>101</SUP> called  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_102">men</A></U><SUB>102</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_102"></A> . </li><li>Olson now clarifies his position, as there are various views that sound similar, but are not at all the same:- <ol type="a"><li>You are not merely intimately connected with a <a name="47"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>103</SUP>, you are numerically identical to one. </li><li>So, the claim is more than that  your <a name="48"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_18.htm">body</A><SUP>104</SUP> is a <a name="49"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>105</SUP>, or that you are <a name="50"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">constituted by</A><SUP>106</SUP> a <a name="51"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>107</SUP>. </li><li>While it seems indisputable that we are identical to <a name="52"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>108</SUP>, once we re agreed that we re material beings,  legions of materialist philosophers deny that we are identical to  our bodies  by which it is tempting to think that they mean  human organisms . </li><li>Some materialist philosophers claim that  my body is distinct from the human organism, which is consistent with my being a <a name="53"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>109</SUP> and yet not identical to my body. </li><li>But, many materialists explicitly deny that we are animals. </li><li>A footnote refers us to:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="280"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_53.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity</A>", p. 57f<BR>&rarr; <a name="186"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", p. 64. <BR>&rarr; <a name="187"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", p. 11<BR>&rarr; <a name="188"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2636.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind</A>", p. 106<BR>&rarr; <a name="189"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>", p. 113<BR>&rarr; <a name="190"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5884.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Coming Into Being and Passing Away: Can the Metaphysician Help?</A>", p. 171<BR></ol></li></ul></li><li><a name="54"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">Psychological continuity</A><SUP>110</SUP> is neither <u>necessary</u> nor <u>sufficient</u> for the <a name="55"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal s</A><SUP>111</SUP> persistence. <ul type="square"><li><b>Vegetable Case</b>: defeats <b>necessity</b> &rarr;<ol type="a"><li>Your associated <a name="56"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>112</SUP> survives when you lapse into a PVS. </li><li>This animal survives with its life-sustaining functions even when it has irrevocably lost all psychological features.</li><li>While alive, this animal doesn t have much of a  life ; there is nothing it is <em>like</em> to be that animal. Yet, it is alive as a goldfish or rosebush is alive. </li><li>It is not the case that one animal has been replaced by a numerically different one. </li><li>So, if you are an animal, you are <u>that</u> animal, and can therefore survive without any <a name="57"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>113</SUP>.</li><li>Maybe the vegetating animal is not a <em>person</em>, since it possesses none of the psychological properties that distinguish <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_114">persons</A></U><SUB>114</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_114"></A> from non-persons. </li><li>All this shows  and this is the punch line  is that you can continue to exist without being a person, just as you would do so without being a philosopher, a student or <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_115">a fancier of fast cars</A></U><SUB>115</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_115"></A>. </li><li>Olson has a footnote in which he sites <a name="191"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21854.htm">Brody (Baruch) - Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative Patient</A>" as supporting the view that the patient in the PVS is the very same being that entered it  and that consequently one can survive without being a person. </ol></li><li><b><a name="58"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Cerebrum Transplants</A><SUP>116</SUP></b>: defeat <b>sufficiency</b> &rarr; <ol type="a"><li>Whatever happens to <em>you</em>, no <a name="59"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>117</SUP> gets transferred along with your <a name="60"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>118</SUP>. </li><li>in particular, the surgeons do not <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_119">pare down</A></U><SUB>119</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_119"></A> the animal until only a <a name="61"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>120</SUP> is left, and then attach a new complement of parts to that animal. </li><li>The (now) empty-headed animal was there all along, not recently created by the surgeons.</li><li>As far as the animal is concerned, a <a name="62"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplant</A><SUP>121</SUP> is like a liver <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_122">transplant</A></U><SUB>122</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_122"></A>. You lose an organ and the capacities  in this case psychological  that go with it. </li><li>You lose the capacity to think and feel  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_123">just as</A></U><SUB>123</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_123"></A> you would lose the capacity to purify your blood if your <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_124">liver</A></U><SUB>124</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_124"></A> were removed. </li><li>Someone else  another <a name="63"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>125</SUP>  gets your psychology  including your personality and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_126">apparent</A></U><SUB>126</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_126"></A> memories. </li><li>Hence, <a name="64"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>127</SUP> isn t sufficient for PID as some unique individual perfectly psychologically continuous with you and with as much physical continuity as might be desired  isn t you!</li><li>We re referred to <a name="192"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3511.htm">Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?</A>" (Chapter 5) for further discussion. </ol> </li></ul></li></ol></li><li><b>A Similar Claim</b>: <ol type="i"><li>The claim that <a name="65"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>128</SUP> don t persist in virtue of <a name="66"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>129</SUP> is similar to the view that a <a name="67"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>130</SUP> persists <em> by virtue of</em> being a <a name="68"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>131</SUP> (or being a living organism, or an animal in general), and NOT by being a person, a human body or anything else. </li><li>Olson s key point is that all <a name="69"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>132</SUP> ought to have the same persistence conditions. <a name="70"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">Human animals</A><SUP>133</SUP> include those  human vegetables, <a name="71"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryos</A><SUP>134</SUP>, anencephalic babies  with no psychological properties. So, all <a name="72"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>135</SUP> have the same persistence conditions as such beings. We re referred to <a name="193"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A>" (Chapter 4). </li><li>So  if <em>we</em> are <a name="73"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>136</SUP>, and all <a name="74"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>137</SUP> have non-psychological persistence conditions  then <em>we</em> have non-psychological persistence conditions. </li><li>The contrasting view is that our persistence conditions  despite the fact that we are animals  include <a name="75"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>138</SUP>. Hence, some animals have radically different persistence conditions to others. Hence, our persistence conditions are not in virtue of our being <a name="76"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>139</SUP>, but by virtue of being members of some other <a name="77"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_80.htm">kind</A><SUP>140</SUP>; <a name="78"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">person</A><SUP>141</SUP>, perhaps. Olson will discuss this further in <a name="194"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>" (Chapter 2). </li></ol></li><li><a name="195"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>" (Chapter 3) will deal with the motivating factors for the PV, why philosophers have been misled by intuitions about the Vegetable and <a name="79"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplant</A><SUP>142</SUP> cases and how the BV can accommodate many of the insights that motivate the PV just as well. </li><li><b>Contrast with the  Physical Criterion </b>: <ol type="i"><li>The BV is by no means the same as the  physical criterion (PC), which is a variant of the PV. </li><li>The <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_143">PC</A></U><SUB>143</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_143"></A> is the view that I persist as some future person just in case some person has enough of my brain for it to be the brain of a living person. </li><li>So, according to this view, I would go along with my <a name="80"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted cerebrum</A><SUP>144</SUP>, and would cease to exist were my brain to be so badly damaged that I were no longer a person, even though my life-sustaining functions continued.</li><li>We re referred to:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="281"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>", p. 204 (ie. <a name="196"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3572.htm">Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be</A>"), <BR>&rarr; <a name="282"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>", p. 7 (ie. <a name="197"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>") and<BR>&rarr; <a name="283"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", p. 109 (ie. <a name="198"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3619.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Physical Approach To Our Survival</A>"). </li></ol></li><li><b>Contrast with the  Bodily Criterion </b>: <ol type="i"><li>The  Body View it that we are identical to our bodies  we persist just in case our bodies do. </li><li>This view has received more attention than the <a name="81"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">Biological View</A><SUP>145</SUP>, and is usually taken to be the main materialist rival to the PV. </li><li>There are important differences between the Biological and Bodily views, but  because they are complex  Olson will defer them until <a name="199"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3512.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Biological Approach</A>" (Chapter 6, Section 6  The Bodily Criterion ). </li><li>Olson claims that those who espouse the  Bodily Criterion usually claim that we are organisms whose persistence criteria have nothing to do with psychology, so we can take this view as a special case of the Biological Approach. </li><li>Olson cites as <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_146">supporters of the view</A></U><SUB>146</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_146"></A> in question:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="257"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Thomson (Judith Jarvis).htm">Judith Jarvis Thomson</A> ,and <BR>&rarr; <a name="258"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/W/Author_Williams (Bernard).htm">Bernard Williams</A>. </li><li>While one <em>could</em> say that I am my body, or go where my body goes, yet deny that I am an animal, Olson thinks this view has little going for it, and will ignore it. </li></ol></li><li><b>Neglect of the Biological Approach</b>: <ol type="i"><li>Olson claims that the <a name="82"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">Biological View</A><SUP>147</SUP> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_148">has been</A></U><SUB>148</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_148"></A>  strangely neglected in the literature. </li><li>He cites  in addition to Thomson and Williams  <a name="259"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/A/Author_Ayers (Michael R.).htm">Michael R. Ayers</A>, <a name="260"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Snowdon (Paul).htm">Paul Snowdon</A> and <a name="261"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/v/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A>  as amongst the  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_149">few advocates</A></U><SUB>149</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_149"></A> of the Biological Approach. </li><li>He claims the view is rarely taken seriously, quoting <a name="284"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1338.htm">Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon</A>", p. 30 (<a name="200"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4954.htm">Pollock (John L.) - Persons and Bodies</A>"), as saying  in 1989  that taking it as a conceptual truth that people are re-identified in terms of their bodies, though much discussed, is a straw man supported by no recent philosopher, and that the only genuinely popular criteria are mentalistic. </li><li><a name="201"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", hailing from 1989, dispenses with the Bodily Criterion by p.5, and never mentions the more general Biological Approach. On p. 3 Noonan claims that TEs undermine the common-sense view that our identity is constituted by bodily continuity. </li><li>Some argue that we could not be bodies, because such objects to not write books, and that one s body  like Lenin s  may continue to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_150">exist long after one s death</A></U><SUB>150</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_150"></A>. Whether or not this is a valid criticism of the Bodily Criterion, it doesn t obviously apply to the view that we are <em>animals</em>. We are again referred to <a name="202"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3512.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Biological Approach</A>" (Chapter 6). </li></ol></li><li><b>Supporters of the PV</b>: <ol type="a"><li>Olson describes <a name="203"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" as  notorious , with  special problems of its own . </li><li>He identifies the following authors (whose relevant works are given in a footnote) as some of the  big names accepting one version or another of the Psychological Approach:-<ol type="i"><li><a name="204"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_228.htm">Grice (H. Paul) - Personal Identity</A>", 1941</li><li><a name="285"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5719.htm">Hospers (John) - An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis - Second Edition</A>", 1967, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_151">pp. 410-414</A></U><SUB>151</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_151"></A> </li><li><a name="205"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", 1987 </li><li><a name="206"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4320.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Fission and the Facts</A>", 1989 </li><li><a name="207"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>", 1976 </li><li><a name="208"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3729.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Personal Identity</A>" , 1976, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_152">p. 202f</A></U><SUB>152</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_152"></A></li><li><a name="209"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3635.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Mind and Body</A>", 1986, p. 40 </li><li><a name="286"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>", 1989, especially <a name="210"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", p. 13 </li><li><a name="211"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_552.htm">Nozick (Robert) - Personal Identity Through Time</A>", 1981 </li><li><a name="212"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_325.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity</A>", 1971 </li><li><a name="213"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3572.htm">Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be</A>", 1984, p. 207 </li><li><a name="214"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_328.htm">Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?</A>", 1972 </li><li><a name="215"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4954.htm">Pollock (John L.) - Persons and Bodies</A>", 1989 </li><li><a name="216"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21875.htm">Price (H.H.) - Two conceptions of the Next World</A>", 1972, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_153">p. 104f</A></U><SUB>153</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_153"></A></li><li><a name="217"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12609.htm">Price (H.H.) - Survival and the Idea of 'Another World'</A>", 1973, p. 27 </li><li><a name="218"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_534.htm">Quinton (Anthony) - The Soul</A>", 1962</li><li><a name="287"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1344.htm">Rosenberg (Jay) - Thinking Clearly About Death</A>", 1983, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_154">pp. 92ff, 223</A></U><SUB>154</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_154"></A> </li><li><a name="219"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2800.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - Do We Survive Death?</A>", 1936, p. 73 </li><li><a name="220"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>", 1970 </li><li><a name="221"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>", 1984, p. 90 </li><li><a name="222"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11985.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Comments on Some Aspects of Peter Unger's Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", 1992</li><li><a name="223"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3620.htm">Unger (Peter) - A Physically Based Approach To Our Survival</A>", 1990 </li><li><a name="224"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", 1976, pp. 168 & 173n.44 </li><li><a name="225"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3496.htm">Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity (S&S)</A>", 1980, pp. 160, 162, 163 </li></ol></li><li>He also supplies a further list, the philosophers presumably not being  big names :- <ol type="i"><li><a name="226"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21855.htm">Agich (George J.) & Jones (Royce P.) - Personal Identity and Brain Death: A Critical Response</A>", 1986, p. 273</li><li><a name="227"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20552.htm">Aune (Bruce) - Changing Things</A>", 1985, p. 93</li><li><a name="288"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_568.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Conditions of Identity</A>", 1988: <a name="228"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3950.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Memories, Bodies, and Survival</A>", p. 275; <a name="229"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3952.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Concepts of a Person</A>", p. 336</li><li><a name="289"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_70.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_155">p. 194ff</A></U><SUB>155</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_155"></A></li><li><a name="230"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5501.htm">Gert (Bernard) - Personal Identity and the Body</A>", 1971</li><li><a name="231"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5249.htm">Green (Michael) & Wikler (Daniel) - Brain Death and Personal Identity</A>", 1980</li><li><a name="232"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20564.htm">Hamlyn (D.W.) - Persons and Personal Identity</A>", 1984, pp. 206-211</li><li><a name="233"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21857.htm">Lizza (John) - Persons And Death: What's Metaphysically Wrong With Our Current Statutory Definition Of Death?</A>", 1993</li><li><a name="234"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", 1985, p. 19</li><li><a name="235"></a>"<A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5976.htm">MacIntosh (J.J.) - A Problem About Identity</A>", 1974</li><li><a name="236"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6028.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Brain Transplants and Personal Identity</A>", 1969</li><li><a name="237"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9221.htm">Robinson (John) - Personal Identity and Survival</A>", 1988</li><li><a name="238"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15846.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity</A>", 1994</li><li><a name="239"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21858.htm">Wikler (Daniel) - Not Dead, Not Dying? Ethical Categories and Persistent Vegetative State</A>", 1988. </li></ol> </ol> </li><li><b>False Friends</b>: Olson thinks that  despite attractive elements (where understood!)  and despite their popularly being supposed to be supporters of the Biological Approach  both David Wiggins and Jay Rosenberg are really supporters of the PV. <ol type="i"><li><a name="262"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">David Wiggins</A>: <ul type="square"><li>According to Olson, Wiggins was then (in 1997) the name most associated with the Biological Approach. </li><li>Although (Olson says) Wiggins had once denied that we are organisms, the  later Wiggins had argued for the opposite view and criticized Lockean accounts that would make our persistence solely a matter of memory. </li><li>However, even this  later Wiggins stops short of what Olson understands by the Biological Approach  which is that psychology is completely irrelevant  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_156">except derivatively</A></U><SUB>156</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_156"></A>  to our persistence. </li><li>In contrast, Wiggins thinks that  certain broadly mental capacities  sentience, desire, belief, motion, memory etc  are part of what it is for a person to remain alive, and so to continue existing. We are referred to <a name="240"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3496.htm">Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity (S&S)</A>", pp. 160, 180, and <a name="241"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", p. 168. </li><li>Although  for Wiggins  memory doesn t determine our persistence on its own, it is  <FONT COLOR = "800080"><em>crucially relevant</em> to our choice of continuity principle for determining the biographies of persons</FONT> , <a name="242"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3496.htm">Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity (S&S)</A>", pp. 162. It  & <FONT COLOR = "800080">informs and regulates the continuity condition of personal identity, and holds it apart from mere continuity of body</FONT> &  (p. 163). </li><li>This is contrary to Olson s view, which treats memory as irrelevant to our persistence, which instead relies on the  distinctive physicalist criterion of life-sustaining vegetative functions. </li><li>Olson thinks Wiggins s view is that if I were to lapse into a PVS, I  the animal  would  perish and only my body would survive. </li><li>Another of Olson s claims is that  while Wiggins doesn t pronounce on <a name="83"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Brain Transplants</A><SUP>157</SUP>, <a name="243"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", p. 173n.44 suggests that it is plausible that <a name="84"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>158</SUP> could be sufficient for one to persist. </li><li>Olson admits that there s much in Wiggins s work that he <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_159">doesn t understand</A></U><SUB>159</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_159"></A>, but thinks it s a sophisticated version of the PV. </li></ul> </li><li><a name="263"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/R/Author_Rosenberg (Jay).htm">Jay Rosenberg</A>: <ul type="square"><li>Olson agrees with Rosenberg that  death is the end because a person just is a  uniquely competent living organism . </li><li>However, he disagrees with Rosenberg that  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_160">one goes where one s organ of thought goes</A></U><SUB>160</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_160"></A> as  he claims  this implies we are not living organisms at all.</li><li>He says that Rosenberg recognises this, as he allows a disjunction  & <em>or</em> a functionally selected part of a living organism . </li><li>Consequently Rosenberg is also consigned to the ranks of the crypto-Psychological Approachers </li><li>We re referred to pp. 96-7 of the first (1983) edition of <a name="290"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1344.htm">Rosenberg (Jay) - Thinking Clearly About Death</A>". </li></ul> </li></ol> </li></ul> </li></ol> <BR><u><b>End Notes</b></u> <BR><BR>I made a few hand-written notes at the end of the Chapter, which are reproduced here for what little they are worth. <ol type="1"><li>Throughout, when Olson talks about  our persistence, his choice is that it refers to the living human organism. This seems to make the term  person either redundant / irrelevant or of identical reference to  human organism . </li><li>What does Olson understand by  person ?</li><li>Is consciousness of  self essential to being a person?</li><li>Is Stephen Hawking (say, or a more diminished individual on a heart-lung machine & drip) a <a name="85"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_56.htm">BIV</A><SUP>161</SUP>?</li><li>The brain as an organ: it was certainly possible to view it so (eg. in Aristotle s time) before its functions were understood, but no longer? </li><li>It seems to me that the regulatory functions of the brain are essential to life, so if we <a name="86"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>162</SUP> these  and get them to regulate another body  we have moved the animal to another body, irrespective of the mental aspects. </li><li>Note different forms of <a name="87"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1172.htm">Sorites</A><SUP>163</SUP> arguments.  Paring down atom by atom isn t the same as gradual replacement of parts while maintaining (or gradually evolving) function. </li><li>If we have a story to tell, we are in a better situation to maintain persistence. </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>My copy of this Chapter of the book is very heavily covered with hand-written notes, most of which are reproduced and refined here. </li><li>In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. </li><li>See also the <a name="88"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">general disclaimer</a>. </li><li>This write-up is logged as a Paper Abstract rather than a Write-up Note. This is contrary to my current standard, and I will make the appropriate adjustment when I ve completed annotating the whole book. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_7"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_7"><B>Footnote 7</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This usage is, of course, tendentious as a personalist who claims  you are essentially a person would (or might) claim that  you then cease to exist.</li><li>There is opportunity to quibble over the assumptions / claims  just which parts of the brain are responsible for what? But, I suppose, the case could always be patched up according to the contingencies of actual brain function  this is an empirical matter. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_8"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Again, what does what is an empirical matter, but it is important as we are not talking about persons in general, but  us who have a specific physical structure. </li><li>As the brain is important to all theories of personal identity, it is important to understand how it works, eg. Via:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="291"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1169.htm">Andrewes (David) - Neuropsychology: From Theory to Practice</A>",</li><li><a name="292"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1165.htm">Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) - Neuroscience</A>", </li><li><a name="293"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1163.htm">Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience</A>", </li><li><a name="294"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1357.htm">DeMyer (William) - Neuroanatomy</A>", </li><li><a name="295"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1340.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy</A>", </li><li><a name="296"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_191.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain</A>", </li><li><a name="297"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_212.htm">Graham (George) & Stephens (G. Lynn) - Philosophical Psychopathology</A>",</li><li><a name="298"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4276.htm">Le Fanu (James) - Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves</A>", </li><li><a name="299"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_653.htm">Restak (Richard) - The Modular Brain</A>", and</li><li><a name="300"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2921.htm">Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person</A>". </li></ol> </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_9"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: This is correct. She was initially put on a respirator, but taken off after a court battle  presumably to die, but she lived on for the reasons Olson gives. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_10"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_10"><B>Footnote 10</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It is difficult to know what to call KQ. </li><li>One is tempted to say  person but this is tendentious. </li><li> <a name="89"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">Human animal </a> is correct, though some will say it s equally tendentious, as insufficient.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_13"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_13"><B>Footnote 13</B></A></U>: This seems to be the definition of (at least the VS part of) a PVS; note the sharp contrast between PVS and brain-death. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_14"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_14"><B>Footnote 14</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>So, presumably, Olson considers brain-dead individuals to be dead. </li><li>Yet, while the body cannot breathe unaided, it must be carrying on a lot of its vegetative functions, metabolizing food and maintaining its body temperature, etc. Presumably only the autonomic nervous system is required for this.</li><li>Olson uses the politically-incorrect term  human vegetable for the individual in the PVS, but this seems better reserved for a brain-dead individual. </li><li>That is, if Olson wants to claim that the individual in the PVS is still an animal, even though it cannot perform any of the (Aristotelian) animalian functions. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_15"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_15"><B>Footnote 15</B></A></U>: Oysters are animals, while oak trees are vegetables. A person in a PVS cannot display any goal-directed behavior in the sense that (even) oysters can. So, can they be said to be displaying animalian characteristics? <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_16"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_16"><B>Footnote 16</B></A></U>: But we re (going to be) interested in <a name="90"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what we are</a> (maybe not in this chapter) so we can t assume too much that is counter-factual. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_17"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_17"><B>Footnote 17</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have some final hand-written footnotes asking <ol type="i"><li>whether identity and non-identity are the only <a name="91"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">alternatives</a>, </li><li>whether there are degrees of <a name="92"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_60.htm">connectedness</a>, and </li><li>what is the situation with <a name="93"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_65.htm">corpses</a>, biological human beings being <a name="94"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_66.htm">cyborgised</a> and bones becoming fossils. </li></ol> </li><li>Presumably, I ought to follow these points up later? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_18"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_18"><B>Footnote 18</B></A></U>: This may be a simpler case  for the <a name="95"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a>  than the <a name="96"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBT</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_20"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_20"><B>Footnote 20</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a big ask, conceptually as well as practically. </li><li>The supposition that brains  or brain-parts  can be rehoused in a new head and make sense of their new bodies  or be integrated with the host brain-part  is very moot. </li><li>For example, the sensory homunculus covers the <a name="97"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a>, so how would this map to the new body?</li><li>Connections are reinforced using  connectionist principles, so how could these  even in principle  be surgically applied  or even known without destroying what is to be <a name="98"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</a>. </li><li>As always, these are empirical matters  cerebra might have been more  modular  but we are talking about  us .</li><li><a name="301"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6414.htm">Claxton (Guy) - Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than it Thinks</A>" argues that the entire body is involved in thought. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_24"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_24"><B>Footnote 24</B></A></U>: She does  recall your past, but  memory  as distinct from  quasi-memory  assumes the identity of the recaller with the individual whose experiences are recalled. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_25"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_25"><B>Footnote 25</B></A></U>: I m not sure of Olson s grammar here, as to whether the  apparently caries through. Maybe it s just that intentions are private to the intender, deduced from the actions. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_26"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_26"><B>Footnote 26</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Baker would say that she has your <a name="99"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">FPP</a>. She probably has. </li><li>But, this is very unlike the <a name="100"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_46.htm">teletransportation</a> case, as the <a name="101"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum-recipient</a> (like Locke s prince and cobbler) has lots of physical evidence that she is not who she thinks she is, or has at the very least been subject to very radical change. </li><li>Yet, if Baker is right, and persons are individuated by FPPs, then she is right to consider herself you. </li><li>But, there is room for doubt that the FPP <u>has</u> been transferred  it may depend on how the case is described  eg. as in <a name="244"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_27"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_27"><B>Footnote 27</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>To avoid tendentiousness, this probably ought to read  recall ,</li><li>Is all memory <a name="102"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum-based</a>? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_29"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_29"><B>Footnote 29</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Maybe she would over time, having the body-donor s body and environment, presumably. </li><li>It s an empirical matter whether she would retain / lose / acquire any skills that might be (substantially) enabled by non-cerebral parts of the CNS / PNS. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_32"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: Not the same as a lobotomy (<a name="W2290W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobotomy" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>). <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_35"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_35"><B>Footnote 35</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Philosophically, <a name="103"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBTs</a> are entirely different to CTs, but here we are talking about practical issues. </li><li>For <a name="104"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBTs</a>, presumably, the  only technical problem is wiring up the nerves in the spinal cord. Even this is doubtful, as there might (for all I know) be a mismatch for different bodies  ie. would we have any  nerves or  connectors left over? </li><li>But for cerebra, it s not clear what would be wired to what. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_38"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_38"><B>Footnote 38</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>He doesn t consider the possibility  coherent under a 4D account of persistence  that you might have <a name="105"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">fissioned</a>, or that the transfer is a case of <a name="106"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_34.htm">fusion</a>.</li><li>He doesn t seem to specify what happened to the recipient s <a name="107"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a>. I presume it is taken to have been destroyed. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_40"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_40"><B>Footnote 40</B></A></U>: This is hard to believe  on any account of PID  because:- <ul type="disc"><li>If you are a <a name="108"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>, you would have survived even if the <a name="109"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> had not been re-housed (analogously to the PVS case). </li><li>If you are a <a name="110"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">person</a>, and the resulting fusion is <u>not</u> you, then admittedly you <u>would</u> have ceased to exist. </li><li>But if you <u>are</u> a person, then the recipient would have ceased to exist (or had moved) when its <a name="111"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> was removed, so there is no principled reason for doubting that you would continue to exist, rehoused, as the recipient is the unique individual enjoying (we suppose) your psychological properties, with appropriate spatio-temporal continuity, etc. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_41"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_41"><B>Footnote 41</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have a hand-written footnote asking how the situation changes if your whole brain, or even your head, is <a name="112"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</a>. </li><li>My note says that  someone  who?  claims that you remain as the headless individual , but that <a name="264"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hershenov (David).htm">David Hershenov</A> (maybe in <a name="245"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4546.htm">Hershenov (David) - Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity</A>"?) denies that Olson thinks this. </li><li><a name="246"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5028.htm">Mackie (David) - Going Topless</A>", by another <a name="113"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a>, is the likely source for the  who . </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_44"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_44"><B>Footnote 44</B></A></U>: Check that it does, and amend this footnote! <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_48"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_48"><B>Footnote 48</B></A></U>: So, Olson points out that this biological continuity is more intimate than that which you would bear to your <a name="114"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_65.htm">corpse</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_51"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_51"><B>Footnote 51</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This distinction between cerebra and whole brains is important. </li><li>The controlling function of the brain-stem and higher brain means that it would be unconvincing to describe this as  just another organ , while  despite the popularity of the PV  this seems much more reasonable for cerebra. </li><li>That said, most  organs have clearly defined boundaries and connections, whereas this isn t so  or not to the same degree  for the cerebral hemispheres. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_55"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_55"><B>Footnote 55</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>There is enough physical continuity to satisfy the holder of the psychological view that there s sufficient causal continuity for the recipient s psychology to be (initially) identical to your own (rather than a copy). </li><li>And there is biological continuity at the cellular level  you could describe the situation as your most important part having moved from one life-support machine to another. </li><li>I have a (probably confused) footnote to the effect that Olson may well (as I do) consider a (human) person to be a <a name="115"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</a> of a <a name="116"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>. But, if so, is it possible for that (very same) <a name="117"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</a> to hop from one animal to another? I suspect not. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_57"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_57"><B>Footnote 57</B></A></U>: So, I might add, does <a name="265"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/F/Author_Feldman (Fred).htm">Fred Feldman</A>, though not Olson himself. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_58"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_58"><B>Footnote 58</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Johnston s view is that each of us is a  Locus of Mental Life , and that this locus is the brain  so we go where our brain goes. </li><li>If we are such a locus  wherever this is instantiated  then it would be a conceptual truth that we can t be outlived by that life. </li><li>I ve now written up Johnston s paper  which deserves the close reading I ve given it. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_60"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_60"><B>Footnote 60</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It seems to me that, it would at least beg the question  and may even be incoherent  to say that <u>one s</u> biological and <a name="118"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</a> can come apart.</li><li>Still, it s an interesting question  on the <a name="119"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a> view  who owns the <a name="120"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</a>. I m not sure what Olson s answer is. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_61"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_61"><B>Footnote 61</B></A></U>: This is an example of the distinction between epistemological and metaphysical questions. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_62"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_62"><B>Footnote 62</B></A></U>: I usually refer to this as the <a name="121"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">PV</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_63"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_63"><B>Footnote 63</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a weaker claim than that I am (identical to) my mind, or that minds can exist <a name="122"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_69.htm">disembodied</a>, and the like. </li><li>Quite what makes a bundle of mental states  my mind is a difficult question for a holder of the PV to answer, as are the reduplication objections. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_64"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_64"><B>Footnote 64</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t have a Note on Content  maybe I should!</li><li>I have a collection of papers on the sub-topic  Content (see <a href="../../PaperCatalogPhilosophyFullCategorisedSubTopic_811.htm">this link</a>). However, most will be associated with slightly different topic in the philosophy of Mind. I do need a Note to sort this out! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_65"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_65"><B>Footnote 65</B></A></U>: I don t have a Note on this either!<a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_68"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_68"><B>Footnote 68</B></A></U>: Is he therefore saying that the relation isn t symmetric? Does it matter?<a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_71"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_71"><B>Footnote 71</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Or, a time when I remembered a time & This is the <u>ancestral</u> of memory, though Olson doesn t use the term.</li><li>I ve dealt with this in an <a name="123"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_876.htm">essay on Locke</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_72"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_72"><B>Footnote 72</B></A></U>: Olson draws no distinction between <a name="124"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_60.htm">continuity and connectedness</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_73"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_73"><B>Footnote 73</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a consequence of the  contents-based PV, but seems very counter-intuitive. </li><li>The main challenge  from the psychological perspective  is from the presumed continuity of the <a name="125"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">FPP</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_74"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_74"><B>Footnote 74</B></A></U>: See <a name="W3577W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korsakoff%27s_syndrome" TARGET = "_top">Korsakoff's Syndrome</A>, etc. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_75"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_75"><B>Footnote 75</B></A></U>: Perry contrasts a  brain zap  where memories are totally removed  with  amnesia in which they are present, but inaccessible. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_77"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_77"><B>Footnote 77</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>See <a name="247"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3619.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Physical Approach To Our Survival</A>". </li><li>As the above title indicates  and this is explicit in the quotation Olson gives  this claim of Unger s assumes physical continuity of some sort. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_78"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_78"><B>Footnote 78</B></A></U>: Indeed, he says Unger  qualifies it in pp. 147-52, ie. in <a name="248"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3620.htm">Unger (Peter) - A Physically Based Approach To Our Survival</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_79"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_79"><B>Footnote 79</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>He lists them as:- <BR>&rarr; <a name="266"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/G/Author_Gert (Bernard).htm">Bernard Gert</A>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="267"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/J/Author_Johnston (Mark).htm">Mark Johnston</A>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="268"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/L/Author_Lockwood (Michael).htm">Michael Lockwood</A>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="269"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/M/Author_Mackie (J.L.).htm">J.L. Mackie</A>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="270"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/N/Author_Nagel (Thomas).htm">Thomas Nagel</A>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="271"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/R/Author_Rosenberg (Jay).htm">Jay Rosenberg</A>, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="272"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">David Wiggins</A>; </li><li>I d thought the references would be given in the section on the PV alloyed to Physical Continuity, as Olson had said  see below for references . However, since they weren t, I presume he ll reference them as he treats of the PV throughout the book. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_80"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_80"><B>Footnote 80</B></A></U>: Olson (like many) oscillates between  material and  physical . There s a technical distinction between the two concepts, but not so as to cause a problem in the present context. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_82"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_82"><B>Footnote 82</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>That, is, so you continue to be a <a name="126"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">person</a>. </li><li>One could quibble about whether more than a <a name="127"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> is needed to support <a name="128"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_61.htm">consciousness</a>. </li><li>Of course, Olson will challenge whether this is even sufficient, as he treats the <a name="129"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> as  just another organ , which can be replaced without affecting our (numerical) identity, and certainly doesn t take  us with it if <a name="130"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_84"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_84"><B>Footnote 84</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a <a name="131"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_48.htm">Brain-state Transfer</a>. </li><li>So, it is a slightly different TE to <a name="132"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_46.htm">Teletransportation</a>, but just as open to <a name="133"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1003.htm">reduplication objections</a>. </li><li>It is also open to Williams-like objections that the recipient just suffers a massive personality change. </li><li>We are referred  in a footnote  to:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="249"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>", p. 108ff (ie. Section 10,  The Brain-State Transfer Device ) <BR>&rarr; <a name="273"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hick (John).htm">John Hick</A>, <em>Philosophy of Religion</em>, 1990  p. 122ff. <BR>&rarr; <a name="302"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4060.htm">Davies (Brian) - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion</A>", p. 125f<BR>&rarr; <a name="250"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_58.htm">Lewis (David) - The Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>". </li><li>The Shoemaker section  indeed the whole of his Chapter  is important and addresses some of my immediate questions, even if it doesn t exactly answer them. </li><li>It is surprising to have two references to Philosophy of Religion. I don t have Hick, and my edition of Davies is the Second (later) edition, and the pagination doesn t seem to match up  nor could I see anything relevant in the Contents or Index, except perhaps Chapter 11   <a name="134"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Life After Death </a>. I doubt it s worth following up. </li><li>The Lewis reference is surprising. Maybe <a name="251"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>" was intended, as both were published in 1976 and feature in Olson s bibliography?</li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_85"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_85"><B>Footnote 85</B></A></U>: This is important  your mental contents (and maybe your mental capacities) might be physically preserved  as Olson suggests  in a big book and posted rather than being transmitted telegraphically. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_87"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_87"><B>Footnote 87</B></A></U>: Is this just sloppiness? <a name="135"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_14.htm">Survival</a> may or may not be equivalent to persistence. See <a name="136"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_89.htm">Parfit</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_88"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_88"><B>Footnote 88</B></A></U>: In the absence of a <a name="137"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">Perdurantist</a> account of persistence. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_91"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_91"><B>Footnote 91</B></A></U>: Olson doesn t here mention the <a name="138"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_41.htm">Closest Continuer</a> theory. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_92"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_92"><B>Footnote 92</B></A></U>: Olson doesn t quite put matters like that. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_93"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_93"><B>Footnote 93</B></A></U>: This statement shows that the book is intended as a positive statement of <a name="139"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</a>, rather than a refutation of the PV. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_95"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_95"><B>Footnote 95</B></A></U>: I have a footnote questioning whether this strictly makes Olson not an <a name="140"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a>. I need to check the strict usage of this term. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_96"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_96"><B>Footnote 96</B></A></U>: Olson irritatingly uses the term  people rather than the accepted term of art  persons . I will use  <a name="141"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">persons</a> . <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_98"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_98"><B>Footnote 98</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t think Olson says what he understands a person  or  people in his terms  to be. </li><li>However, intelligence, rationality and consciousness seem to be on his list of required attributes. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_102"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_102"><B>Footnote 102</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Thus, Olson seems to dismiss out of hand Locke s main claim to fame in this area  the distinction between  persons and  men . </li><li>However, the distinction can be maintained by the <a name="142"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalist</a>  by taking  person to be a non-substance term, but rather an honorific applied to the substances, <a name="143"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</a> (and other substances that deserve it). </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_114"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_114"><B>Footnote 114</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson says  people , again when he really ought to say  persons . </li><li>He gives a couple of sample attributes: rationality and the capacity for self-consciousness. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_115"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_115"><B>Footnote 115</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The two others seem to be candidates for being <a name="144"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">Phase Sortals</a>, while this one seems rather flippant. </li><li>The important point is that students (say) are not separate individuals from the persons (or animals) that are students, but pick them out during phases of their careers. </li><li>This is also my  line on what human persons are  <a name="145"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortals</a> of <a name="146"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</a>. </li><li>The important point is that  if this is what persons are  then we are not persons; Olson s view is that we are animals, full stop, though we may be persons for periods of our existence. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_119"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_119"><B>Footnote 119</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is an interesting alternative description of what is supposed to take place. </li><li>I agree that it is inappropriate in this case; the reasons being:- <BR>&rarr; A <a name="147"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> is not an animal, and<BR>&rarr; There are two <a name="148"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrums</a>, so there are reduplication objections (though maybe Olson means both <a name="149"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrums</a> to avoid this objection).</li><li>However, it is more appropriate in the case of a <a name="150"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBT</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_122"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_122"><B>Footnote 122</B></A></U>: This reads oddly. Rather, it s like an organ donation  eg. of a kidney to a sibling. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_123"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_123"><B>Footnote 123</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the key claim. </li><li>There would be o temptation to say that you had ceased to exist, or  were no longer the same person if you lost your liver, but many would claim this if you lost all mental capacity. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_124"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_124"><B>Footnote 124</B></A></U>: Shouldn t this be  kidneys , though removing toxins from the blood is one of the many functions of the liver?<a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_126"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_126"><B>Footnote 126</B></A></U>: These memories are your memories, but only apparent memories for the recipient of your <a name="151"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> if that person isn t you. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_143"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_143"><B>Footnote 143</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t seem to have a Note on the  physical criterion , though I do have one on <a name="152"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_15.htm">physical continuity</a>, and also on the <a name="153"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_910.htm">psychological criterion</a>. I need to create an extra Note. </li><li>However, I m not sure there is any one such view.</li><li>What Olson describes sounds to me like the <a name="154"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Brain Criterion</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_146"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_146"><B>Footnote 146</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson doesn t give references here, but <BR>&rarr; <a name="252"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1328.htm">Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - People and Their Bodies</A>", and <BR>&rarr; <a name="253"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2438.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Are Persons Bodies?</A>" <BR>Look relevant & useful.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_148"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_148"><B>Footnote 148</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This was back in 1997; since then, <a name="155"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</a> has become more popular. </li><li>See my <a name="156"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">Note on Animalists</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_149"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_149"><B>Footnote 149</B></A></U>: I have my doubts about van Inwagen in this regard. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_150"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_150"><B>Footnote 150</B></A></U>: See the discussion on <a name="157"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_65.htm">Corpses</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_151"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_151"><B>Footnote 151</B></A></U>: I have the right edition, and this is the start of the section on Personal Identity in Chapter 20 ( Mind and Body ). <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_152"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_152"><B>Footnote 152</B></A></U>: This would be just the last two pages of the Chapter, so the pagination may be wrong. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_153"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_153"><B>Footnote 153</B></A></U>: The Section on  <a name="158"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_69.htm">Disembodied</a> Survival . <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_154"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_154"><B>Footnote 154</B></A></U>: I have the second edition from 1998 and the pagination is different. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_155"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_155"><B>Footnote 155</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have the right edition, but I m not convinced that this is the right page  it s part of <a name="254"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3521.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - After-Life for Materialists</A>", section 1 ( Resurrection , entitled  D. Is Bodily Identity Sufficient ).</li><li>This book was superseded, in 2004, by <a name="303"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_72.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_156"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_156"><B>Footnote 156</B></A></U>: I don t know what this caveat is supposed to mean. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_159"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_159"><B>Footnote 159</B></A></U>: Several things here:- <ol type="1"><li>I agree that Wiggins s work is  difficult , and wonder whether Olson has him right. </li><li>Saying that <a name="159"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</a>  as distinct from human persons   perish when lapsing into a PVS seems clearly incorrect. </li><li>It looks to me as though Wiggins is taking the person as the substance term, a person being a <a name="160"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</a> of a <a name="161"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>. In contrast Olson  as do I  takes the animal as the substance, so I am identical to the animal, but have the property of being a person for stages of my existence. </li><li>Wiggins updated his views in <a name="304"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>", 2001, after Olson was writing.</li><li>He had earlier (1996) clarified his views in an interchange - <a name="255"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1220.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons and Personal Identity</A>" & <a name="256"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4191.htm">Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)</A>" - recorded in <a name="305"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_38.htm">Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) - Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins</A>", though Olson makes no mention of this. </li></ol> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_160"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_160"><B>Footnote 160</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is what Olson refers to elsewhere as the  <a name="162"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplant</a> intuition .</li><li>It is really hard to resist  so much so that saying that a brain is a  maximally mutilated (or  pared down ) human organism may be the way to go. </li><li>We don t need to include psychology as the motivator for this intuition  the regulatory function may do  but have the psychological  <a name="163"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">first person perspective</a> benefits come along for the ride. </li><li>That said, the <a name="164"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplantee</a> would consider himself to have swapped bodies, there would be a principled reason why he has, no rival candidates and little objection in either the philosophical or wider community. What more could you want?</li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:09" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:09:00</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>