Persistence
Olson (Eric)
Source: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 2, pp. 22-41
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  1. This chapter is about how to state the question of personal identity over time.
  2. The question is often put in a way that assumes a person cannot start out or end up as a nonperson.
  3. This prejudges an important metaphysical question, and rules out the Biological Approach.
  4. The chapter then turns to the language of identity over time in general.

Sections
  1. Criteria of Personal Identity
  2. Substance Concepts
  3. Movers and Thinkers
  4. “Person P1 and Time t1

Annotations1
  1. Criteria of Personal Identity
    • The Psychological Approach is a proposed criterion of personal identity – what it takes for a person to exist at two different times.
    • Olson sees two problems with making the claim sufficiently precise to be accepted by both supporters and detractors:-
      1. Confusion about persistence through time in general – to be treated in Section 4 of this Chapter.
      2. What is it to give a criterion of identity for people2 as opposed to other things?
    • Olson has a couple of stabs at the criterion in logical form3.
      1. The first is a psychological relation R between a person at one time, and another individual at another time. There is no explicit pre-requisite that this “second” individual be a person, but it clearly must be capable of entertaining a psychology such that R holds.
      2. The second version – just an example – makes R explicit. Requirements are psychological continuity4 and uniqueness at each time between the end-times of identification.
    • Olson’s preferred understanding of the question is to take someone who is a person at a time and ask under what conditions is something – “anything at all” – existing at another time numerically identical to that person.
    • There is – however – an objection, which Olson dismisses5. Some say that you can’t say anything of a “thing” without saying what sort of thing you are referring to. In David Wiggins’s terms, a “thing” is “not an adequate covering concept”.
    • Olson stresses – with an allusion to "Wiggins (David) - Outline of a Theory of Individuation (S&S)", p. 53 (“Proposition D and the rationale of the ‘same what?’ question”) – that such “criteria” are constitutive rather than epistemic – they are about what “our identity through time consists in” not about how “we find out whether a person has survived or perished”.
    • Olson points out the radical distinction between his formulation of the criterion for a person’s persistence through time and that proposed by the majority of philosophers: Olson has the later individual unconstrained in kind6, while the majority view is that both putative identicals have to be persons.
    • Olson thinks there are several reasons why the majority view is objectionable:-
      1. A quibble: “same person” is ambiguous. While taken by philosophers to require numerical identity7, there are alternative understandings of “sameness relations”:-
        1. Numerically distinct individuals can be the same K, for some K: eg. Bill Clinton and Robert Reagan were the same official.
        2. Analogously8, non-philosophers may understand “being the same person” as a resemblance or continuity that neither entails nor is entailed by numerical identity. Someone may no longer “be the same person” since she underwent some major psychological change (such as a religious conversion). Olson will discuss this further in the next Chapter ("Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach").
      2. We can satisfy the previous objection by using the expression “being one and the same as” rather than “being the same person as”. However, this raises a deeper issue …
      3. The “same person” relation relies on you persisting as a person – but this prejudges the issue.
      4. The term “person” is usually used by philosophers to imply the capacities of rationality and self-consciousness9 – so that “you and I are “people10” whereas dogs and cats aren’t”.
      5. Olson notes that not all philosophers agree with this definition of “person11”. We’re referred to two:-
        1. "Chisholm (Roderick) - Coming Into Being and Passing Away: Can the Metaphysician Help?", p. 181: Chisholm says that a person is anything that can come to be rational and conscious. Olson claims this is “no more than a verbal disagreement” – but it strikes me as substantive, as it would make fetuses12 persons, which many deny.
        2. "Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind", p. 164ff: Wiggins – for reasons Olson finds “obscure13” – thinks that the Lockean definition of “person” is “morally and politically pernicious”.
      6. It is at least arguable – on this definition of “person” – that fetuses14 are not persons, and that those in a PVS15 are not persons. So, each of us – it might be argued16 – might not be or remain a person throughout the full period of our existence.
      7. Even if – for some reason – this is not so, it is a question for philosophical investigation, and should not be decided merely by our definition of persistence for persons.
    • Olson rejects the view that it is in some sense paradoxical that a person can exist while not yet being, or no longer being, a person. His analogy is with “infant”. When an infant grows up, he is no longer an infant, but that infant continues to exist – as an adult or a philosopher. Olson wants us to treat “person” just as we treat17 “infant” (or “adult” or “philosopher”). He’ll address this matter further in Section II (“Substance Concepts”).
    • Olson considers whether his proposal is purely verbal. If personal identity is about persons, then either:-
      1. He’s disagreeing with his opponents about the meaning of the words “personal identity”, or |
      2. He’s refusing to discuss the topic of personal identity and talking about something else instead.
      In support of this contention, we are referred to
      "Gert (Bernard) - Personal Identity and the Body", p. 475 ff, “the question of personal identity does not arise if the body has no psychological features”, and
      "Johnston (Mark) - Relativism and the Self", p. 449
    • He admits that there are indeed two questions – the broad one he wants to consider, where one end-point is unconstrained, and the narrow one restricted to persons at both ends. Both questions are legitimate, but – Olson claims – philosophers often mistakenly ask the narrow question when they mean to be asking the broad one. He thinks the narrow question uninteresting18.
      1. In support of this contention, Olson points out that – while a standard psychological criterion19 answering the narrow question would agree that if your cerebrum is transplanted20, the recipient would be you, thereby ruling out the BV as an answer to the broad21 question, it is silent on other questions.
      2. So, in the transplant22 case where your cerebrum23 is destroyed, it says nothing about whether you survive – other than if you do, it’s not as a person. Similarly with the vegetable case.
    • Olson thinks that supporters of the PV intend their answers to be of the broad question. They claim that you cease to exist when your mind is destroyed – not just that you cease to be a person.
    • If it were a necessary truth that “person24” is a substance25 concept, then the broad and narrow questions would be equivalent, which is why they are so often run together. This will be addressed in the next section.
    • If I could start as a person and end as a non-person, isn’t it misleading to describe the problem of my persistence as “personal identity”?
    • Olson’s response is that we are people, and he’s interested in our identity, just the same as has historically been the case.
    • However, he denies that there is any single criterion of identity suitable for all and only people (“persons”) – he runs through the usual list of potential persons – as they have different persistence conditions26.
    • However, according to Olson’s version of the BV, the question of our identity boils down to “under what possible circumstances is something that is a human animal27 at one time the same animal28 as a human animal29 at another time?”. Yet, stating the question of our identity this way is as tendentious30 as the narrow statement of the PV.
    • So, in summary – Olson claims – there is no such thing as “personal identity” and more than “philosopher identity”. We can ask what it takes for a philosopher to persist through time, but not as a philosopher. The same goes for infants and – Olson claims – “people”.
  2. Substance Concepts
    • Supporters of the PV typically assume without question that personhood is what Wiggins (in "Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity" – ie. "Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity: Parts 1.3-8: Five Ways to be Wrong About Relative Identity", p. 7 – and "Wiggins (David) - The Absoluteness of Sameness (S&S)", p. 24) calls a substance concept. While I may also be an adult, a human being, a club member, being a person is a more privileged position because “a person” is what I am31 most fundamentally, and it is this – it is assumed – that determines my persistence conditions32. I’m a person first and everything else second.
    • Olson gives an extensive quotation from "Wiggins (David) - The Absoluteness of Sameness (S&S)", p. 15 to the effect that:-
      1. Every particular object falls under some kind or concept33 that tells us – or would tell us if we knew it – what that object is, as distinct from describing some accidental features of it, and
      2. This concept determines the persistence conditions34 that necessarily apply to things of this kind.
    • Olson claims that this view – hailing originally from Aristotle (says Wiggins) – is too fundamental to argue for against a detractor, but is one that he will rely on throughout this book.
    • However, the theory of substance doesn’t tell us what substance concept we fall under.
    • Olson claims that treating person as a substance concept has two interesting consequences:-
      1. All persons would have the same persistence conditions35 – and if not we’d have to invent further substance concepts like A-people and B-people.
      2. Once a person, always a person. It would be incoherent to talk about former people or potential people. A non-person doesn’t have its persistence criteria36 in virtue of being a person, and a thing cannot change its persistence criteria37 partway through its career. This will be discussed further in Chapter 4 ("Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)").
    • So, if I was once a non-person, and survived the transition from non-person to person, there must be some other substance-concept under which I fall. Olson also claims that this would show that person is not a substance-concept38.
    • We need to distinguish substance concepts from what Wiggins – in the same two references cited at the start of this Section – calls phase sortals39, such as “child”, which are kinds that something can belong to temporarily. Phase sortals40 as such41 don’t have persistence criteria42, and to become a philosopher is not to come into existence simpliciter.
    • Olson has an extensive footnote on “a complication that he shall ignore”:-
      1. In "Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity: Parts 1.3-8: Five Ways to be Wrong About Relative Identity", p. 7, Wiggins:-
        1. Defines substance concepts as “sortal43 concepts which present-tensedly apply to an individual x at every moment throughout x’s existence”, and
        2. Claims that these “give the privileged and (unless context makes it otherwise) the most fundamental answer to the question ‘what is x?’
      2. However, it might be possible for something to be a substance concept in sense (a) without being so in sense (b).
      3. Sense (a) is “an abiding sort” in "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves", p. 87 or a “temporally essential attribute” in "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", p. 12.
      4. Olson equates sense (b) with “determining the persistence conditions44 for all and only things of that kind”, but I don’t see why he makes this leap. He calls sense (b) an “ultimate sort”.
      5. This theory appears after a fairly long motivating example: if people shared all their persistence conditions45 with some non-people – such as gorillas – then they would have their persistence criteria46 in virtue of falling under some kind that included both people and gorillas - thinking being maybe. While it would be true that we are people – and true (for the sake of the argument) that we are people throughout our careers, a more fundamental answer to the “what are we47?” question would be “a member of the wider class that includes both people and gorillas”. I didn’t see the cogency48 of this argument at all.
    • So, anyone who takes person to be a substance concept can argue for the PV as follows:-
      1. The concept of a person is at least partly a psychological concept: any person has to be rational and self-aware, for instance.
      2. Because people have their persistence conditions49 in virtue of their being people, we should expect their persistence conditions50 to have something to do with psychology.
      3. So, at the least, we can expect a person not to survive in a PVS51, or as the relict following a cerebrum transplant52, as such beings aren’t people.
    • Olson claims, therefore, that anyone who takes person to be a substance concept in effect assumes the PV53.
    • If person is only a phase sortal54, then the above argument is no more convincing than would be one of the same form that claimed that an athlete55 could not survive the loss of his athletic abilities. Such an argument is invalid because athlete is not a substance concept – because athletes do not have their persistence conditions56 in virtue of being athletes.
    • So, according to the BV, person is not a substance concept but a phase sortal57 like athlete.
    • Olson rehearses the usual examples of non-biological persons with different persistence conditions58 to human persons and that biological people have the same persistence conditions59 some as non-persons (fetuses60 or those in a PVS)61.
    • He adds that it is likely that our persistence conditions62 are the same as aardvarks63, oysters or animals in general.
    • So, our substance concept – what we most fundamentally are – is not person but rather Homo Sapiens, animal or64 living organism.
    • Derek Parfit has suggested to Olson that “person” is ambiguous and can be used either as a phase sortal65 or as a substance concept. This might reduce discussion to arguments about words – what is the primary English usage of the word “person”, say. However, Olson thinks the suggestion gets us into “deep waters”: both these terms cannot apply to a person at the same time, because a phase sortal66 person would fall under a substance-concept other than PersonAnimal for instance – that has persistence conditions67 inconsistent with the substance concept Person. A phase sortal68 person would have modal69 and possibility historical properties impossible for a substance-concept Person.
    • So, in what sense of Person are we people?
      1. If we are phase sortal70 people, the PV is false, as we might once have been non-people, and so could survive radical psychological discontinuity.
      2. If we are people in the substance-concept sense, the PV is true.
    • But, the issue is non-verbal:-
      1. If the PV is true, there could not be any people of the phase sortal71 sort for if there were they would be rational, self-conscious agents of whom the PV is false. We are referred to Chapter 5 ("Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?"), Section V (“Why We Are Animals”).
      2. If the BV is true, there are presumably no people72 in the substance-concept sense even if there is such a substance-concept73.
    • In the next section Olson will consider an argument that there is no substance-concept sense74 of ‘person’.
  3. Movers and Thinkers
    • If person is a substance-concept, it’s easy to argue that the PV is true. However, if not, it’s hard to see how the PV could be true. If we are animals, say, in that our persistence conditions75 are those of animals, then those persistence conditions76 cannot be psychological, as many animals persist without any psychology at all.
    • This raises a difficult challenge for the PV, because it’s not clear that person (or thinker77, or similar) could be a substance concept.
    • Olson reminds us of the difference between substance-concepts, that answer “what is it?” questions, and other concepts that answer attributive questions (“where is it?”, “what does it weigh?”, …).
    • Olson thinks that “person” – in the sense considered by the PV – focuses on what an individual does, rather than what it is. Such a person can ordinarily think in a certain way – it is rational, conscious, self-aware, morally accountable78, and the like. But this capacity doesn’t tell us what it is – it might be79 a human animal80, an angel Cartesian ego, …
    • Olson attempts to show the difficulty by his “locomotor” analogy81:-
      1. We are to imagine a philosopher impressed by “locomotive capacities” – the ability to move under one’s own steam, a capacity shared by human beings and lots of other things. Such beings are “locomotors”.
      2. By analogy with TEs involving cerebrum transplants82 according to the PV, we are to imagine that:-
        1. A ship with a broken engine ceases to exist;
        2. Adding a motor to a prior non-locomotor creates a numerically different individual;
        3. Moving the engine from one ship to another makes the recipient identical to the donor.
        4. If locomotor has two engines – by analogy with the two cerebral hemispheres – fission paradoxes arise if they are transplanted83.
        5. If a locomotor (eg. Stephen Hawking) loses its means of locomotion, it perishes, even though it is otherwise fully functional
      3. Why is the locomotor theory so daft?
        1. Compare crabs and barnacles. Our theory is unimpressed by evolutionary proximity and similar physiology but insists that they – and even crabs that cannot move – belong to different substantial kinds.
        2. Juvenile barnacles are locomotors – pending their attachment to their rock – so are numerically distinct from their sessile adults, having – on this theory – different persistence conditions84.
        3. If we compare a healthy crab with a model airplane they are anatomically utterly distinct and have different ways of maintaining themselves – or being maintained – in existence. But our locomotor theorist is unimpressed – the fact that they are both locomotors is sufficient for them to form a kind.
        4. If – somehow – crabs and battleships did have the same persistence conditions85 – different to barnacles and rowboats – we would not expect this to be because the former are locomotors and the latter not, but because – contrary to all expectation – crabs and battleships turned out to have some more significant feature in common.
        5. Self-locomotion is just not the sort of feature that could determine an object’s persistence conditions86. Locomotor could not be a substance-concept.
      4. Further:-
        1. If you ask “what’s that” pointing to a crab, and get the answer “a locomotor”, this doesn’t answer your question. Lots of things can move, but what is this one? So, what’s wrong with the “locomotor” answer?
        2. Olson thinks this is a difficult matter, but that part of the problem is that locomotion is dispositional or functional property realized in a wide variety of intrinsic structures. Locomotors may have little in common beyond the ability to perform a certain task – and even that may be grounded in completely different internal structures.
        3. Morover, some non-locomotors have more in common with some locomotors than different locomotors have with one another.
        4. So, locomotion appears to be a superficial similarity. A difference or similarity in one particular ability need have no wider significance.
        5. locomotion is a mere capacity – and one that is not closely connected to a thing’s internal structure. Anything whatever that is functionally-equivalent will do.
          Hence, Locomotor is a functional kind, rather than a substance-concept.
      5. Assuming that this is a correct diagnosis of the problems with “locomotors”, Olson now makes the explicit comparison with way the PV takes “person” to be a substance-concept:-
        1. Person also seems to be a functional kind rather than a substance-concept. To be a person is to have certain mental properties, and – according to a widely-accepted theory87 – these are essentially dispositions. Mental states have causal powers, and there’s no a priori reason why these have to be grounded in brain-states. Other structures – in Martians or computers – might do just as well, so such beings might also be people.
        2. Personhood is – like locomotion – merely88 a capacity of a thing. Olson claims – maybe improbably – that the various candidate persons have less in common than crabs and battleships (candidate locomotors). So, saying someone is a person tells us even less about them than calling them a locomotor.
        3. Olson points out the PV analogies to the “daft” consequences of the locomotor theory given above. While the analogies are fairly obvious, some of what he has to say is sufficiently contentious to be worth remarking on.
      6. “Daft” consequences:-
        1. Olson claims that just as a barnacle larva would cease to exist on losing its locomotive capacity, so would a human organism cease to exist on losing its mental capacities – and both are numerically distinct from the sessile / non-cognitive beings that supersede them. This seems a conceptual error to me89.
        2. He also points out the intended analogy that a cerebrum90 transfer extinguishes the recipient animal. I think this is open to the same objection.
        3. Both theories claim that different members of the same biological species91 may fall under different substance concepts, and have completely different persistence conditions92.
        4. Olson will consider these matters further in
          → Chapter 4: "Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)", and
          → Chapter 5: "Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?"
      7. So, supporters of the PV need to explain why person is a substance-concept, while locomotor isn’t.
      8. The BV doesn’t have this problem, as human animal93 and similar variants are paradigm-cases of substance-concepts, and an excellent answer94 to the question “what is it that thinks”.
    • Olson now considers the objection that personhood is more than a mere dispositional property and having certain psychological capacities. Maybe it is more like animal or immaterial substance than locomotor.
      1. It’s hard to evaluate this claim without an actual proposal95.
      2. However, Olson doesn’t think it’ll be possible because the difference between persons and non-persons of the same ((human) species is simply a matter of what they can do – one can think and act and the other – an anencephalic infant, say – cannot.
      3. Of course, these abilities – or the lack thereof – are grounded in neural structures, but these are not part of the concept of a person since non-human, non-biological persons can be such without any biological brains at all. It’s only what the brain can do that’s important.
    • Can’t we restrict96 the scope of the PV to human people?
      1. Olson thinks it would be “surprising” if the PV only applied to human people.
      2. Even if there are in fact only human people, there might have been non-human ones.
      3. Such non-human-persons – whether angels or aliens – would have the same reasons for accepting the PV as human persons. Why should they be mistaken and we correct?
      4. It seems that some versions of the PV97 – eg. Peter Unger’s – require physical as well as psychological continuity98, so cannot apply to immaterial people.
      5. But – says Olson – we should not expect such an account to be true of material people unless some generalization were true of immaterial people.
      6. That is, if we survive just in case our mental capacities are preserved in a physically continuous way – we should expect any person to survive just in case her mental capacities are preserved in some analogous way99.
  4. “Person P1 and Time t1
    • Olson now turns to a technical matter that he says deserves more attention than it has received, though it “may never have led anyone astray” so the bored are encouraged to skip100!
    • The problem of PID is usually stated as the filling in of the dots in a statement like
        A: x at time t is identical to y at time t* iff …
      with a criterion of identity.
    • But, how are we to understand the variables and times? Should we make substitutions like in the formulation below?
        B: Tom today is identical to Tim tomorrow iff …
    • How are we to understand the temporal qualifications?
      1. They seem to be adverbs telling us when the predicates are true of the subjects. So, is B telling us that the identity holds between Tom and Tim at two different times, just like Tom might visit Tim at two different times? In that case, the formulation would be
          C: Tom and Tim are one, both today and tomorrow, iff …
      2. Olson thinks this cannot be right. There is no point qualifying a predicate with an adverb unless different adverbs can change the truth value of the sentence. Tom doesn’t visit Tim all the time, but if Tom and Tim are one, they are necessarily101 so and not just identical at certain times. It’s as odd as saying “5 is greater than 3 in Cleveland”.
      3. However, a possibility is that the temporal predicates merely indicate that Tom and Tim exist at the times in question. This would lead to
          D: Tom and Tim are identical, and exist today and tomorrow, iff …
      4. Hence102, the temporal adverbs in A and B modify the predicate “exists” – which appears in the “deep structure” of the sentences – rather than “is identical with”. If so, it is at best misleading to use them to talk of identity through time. Additionally, the order of the temporal adverbs could be reversed without affecting the sense, and one could be omitted while leaving a meaningful sentence.
      5. Olson doesn’t think this is what philosophers want to say when using “x at t”. When we fill out A to become
          x at t is identical to y at t* iff x at t is psychologically continuous with y at t*
        we cannot simply reverse the times or leave one out without changing the meaning.
    • Some have argued against the adverbial use of the temporal predicates, saying what is meant by “Tom today” is a noun phrase signifying the temporal part of Tom that occurs today.
      • We are referred to "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Plantinga on Trans-world Identity" (1985) and to Chapter 7 ("Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives"), Section III.
      • This proposal seems to give us an awkward choice. Either:-
        1. The “identity statement” is not talking about identity at all, but is saying that the “today part” of Tom is part of the same person as the “tomorrow part” of Tim, or
        2. If it is talking about identity, it’s making a false statement as temporal parts even of the same individual cannot be identical unless they are the very same part, though "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Plantinga on Trans-world Identity", p. 106 shows how the temporal-part theorist can avoid this.
      • In any case, this option is only open to those who espouse the “contentious” doctrine of temporal parts. Olson will discuss this in Chapter 7 (see reference above).
      • However, there is a kernel of truth in this proposal …
    • How are we to understand the relata of the identity predicate?
      1. The temporal adverbs do not modify the identity predicate. Rather, they determine the relata of that predicate: “they are components of complex noun phrases”.
      2. “Tom” and “Tim” are bad examples as their reference cannot be modified by temporal qualification: they are rigid designators103.
      3. A better example would be of Definite Descriptions104; “the sapling back then” … “the tree today”.
      4. So, Schema A is – if interpreted in the usual way – both semantically and grammatically confused. A better attempt would be:-
          The x that is F at t is the y that is G at t*
    • So, if we interpret the temporal expressions in identity statements as closet Definite Descriptions, what are we to make of the conditions of identity?
      1. We are referred to "Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity", Chapter 1 - "Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey" p. 13 (“The revised psychological continuity105 criterion”)
          P2 at t2 is the same person as P1 at t1 iff P2 at t2 is psychologically continuous with P1 at t1
      2. Psychological continuity106 is a 4-place relation between two people and two times.
      3. Olson gives an example of someone who suffered some radical psychological change (then) 10 years ago. She is now psychologically continuous with herself following this change, but not with herself before the change – as is agreed by both those who say she survived the change and those who deny it107. We cannot leave out the times.
      4. So, Olson claims that the least misleading way of claiming that psychological continuity108 is necessary109 for a person to persist is:-
          Necessarily, for any x that is a person at t, and any y that exists at another time t*, x=y only if x is at t psychologically continuous with y as she is at t*.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Footnote 2: Footnote 3: Footnote 4: Footnote 5: Footnote 6: Several issues here:-
  1. Olson doesn’t use the term “Kind” immediately, but does so when he gets to shared office-holders forming a kind.
  2. Do “persons” as such form a kind? This – presumably – depends what we mean by “kind”. Olson seems to use it where others might use “sort” or Sortal.
  3. Can the very same individual change its kind? Again, this depends whether it’s a substance-kind or not.
  4. See my notes on Kinds, Natural Kinds and Metamorphosis.
Footnote 8: I don’t really see the analogy, but agree with what Olson says.

Footnote 10: Olson’s usual annoying usage.

Footnote 11: Also, see my Note.

Footnote 13: I need to re-read this paper by Wiggins to determine what he means.

Footnote 16: Footnote 17: Footnote 18: Footnote 21: This is an important point, which is that – given that on this view you survive the transplant in the form of the recipient, the “brainless relict” cannot be you, as the BV claims.

Footnote 26: Footnote 28: The omission of “human” here is benign, as the animals being compared are both human. Olson doesn’t contemplate the possibility of princes turning into frogs.

Footnote 30: Because it assumes that we are human animals, just as the PV assumes that we are persons.

Footnote 37: Footnote 38: Footnote 41: They do have persistence criteria, of course, but these criteria are derivative of the substance concept under which they fall – “human animal” or “human being” in the case of human children.

Footnote 48: Footnote 53: Footnote 55: Footnote 63: Footnote 64: Footnote 72: Footnote 73: Footnote 74: Footnote 77: Footnote 78: This is a bit slippery – a person is not just supposed to think they are morally accountable, but to actually have a moral status – an ontological claim.

Footnote 79: As usual, Olson takes this as indicating “numerically identical to” rather than – as Baker would argue – “constituted by”.

Footnote 81: Footnote 87: Footnote 88: This exposes Olson to Baker’s complaint that he (and others) “don’t take persons seriously”.

Footnote 89: Footnote 91: Footnote 94: Footnote 95: Footnote 96: Footnote 97: Footnote 99: Footnote 100: I’ve analyzed what Olson has to say – in my usual plodding way – to make sure I’ve “got it”.

Footnote 101: This assumes the standard account of Identity (Click here for Note) rather than – say – contingent identity.

Footnote 102: Olson doesn’t make the logical transition to this bullet explicit, but I think this is what he intends.

Footnote 103: Footnote 104: Comment initially as above, though Olson does use it shortly!

Footnote 107: This story is difficult to relate without pre-judging the issue of identity.

Footnote 109:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

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