Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects
Heller (Mark)
Source: Heller - The Ontology of Physical Objects, Chapter 1
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperColour-ConventionsDisclaimer


Author’s Abstract1

  1. In the first chapter2 I begin to explain my recommended ontology of four-dimensional hunks of matter.
  2. I propose that such objects are physical and have temporal parts in just the same way that supposed three-dimensional objects would have spatial parts.
  3. However, I emphasize that the four-dimensional objects should not be thought of as being "built up out of" instantaneous parts. Indeed, one can accept my proposed ontology without accepting that there are any instantaneous objects.
  4. I argue in detail that accepting my ontology avoids commitment to such objectionable theses as that two objects can exist in one place at one time.
  5. I also argue in detail that certain general criticisms of ontologies that include temporal parts do not apply to the particular ontology I have offered.

Comment:

Also in "Loux (Michael), Ed. - Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings".



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Footnote 2:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2020. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page