What We Believe Ourselves To Be
Parfit (Derek)
Source: Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 199-219(21).
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Discusses numerical identity1, or being one and the same, qualitative identity, or being exactly similar2, personal identity, or what is involved in our continued existence over time.
  2. According to the Physical Criterion, our identity over time consists in the continued existence of enough of our brain.
  3. According to the Psychological Criterion3, our identity consists in overlapping chains of psychological continuity4 and connectedness5.
  4. The chapter discusses how we are inclined to believe that, even in purely imagined cases, our identity must be determinate. When we ask – Would I still exist? Would that future person be me?, it seems that it must always have an answer.

Sections
  1. Simple Teletransportation6 and the Branch-Line Case
  2. Qualitative and Numerical identity7
  3. The Physical Criterion of Personal Identity
  4. The Psychological Criterion8
  5. The Other Views
Comment:

Part 3: Personal Identity: Chapter 10

Write-up9 (as at 29/12/2019 12:57:36): Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be

This write-up is a review of "Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be".

Abstract: Discusses numerical identity10, or being one and the same, qualitative identity, or being exactly similar, personal identity, or what is involved in our continued existence over time. According to the Physical Criterion, our identity over time consists in the continued existence of enough of our brain. According to the Psychological Criterion, our identity consists in overlapping chains of psychological continuity and connectedness. The chapter discusses how we are inclined to believe that, even in purely imagined cases, our identity must be determinate. When we ask – Would I still exist? Would that future person be me? it seems that it must always have an answer.

Sections
  • 75. Simple Teletransportation and the Branch-Line Case
  • 76. Qualitative and Numerical identity11
  • 77. The Physical Criterion of Personal Identity
  • 78. The Psychological Criterion
  • 79. The Other Views

75. Simple Teletransportation and the Branch-Line Case

76. Qualitative and Numerical identity12

77. The Physical Criterion of Personal Identity

78. The Psychological Criterion

79. The Other Views


… Further details to be supplied13

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 9:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (29/12/2019 12:57:36).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)


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