What We Believe Ourselves To Be |
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Parfit (Derek) |
Source: Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 199-219(21). |
Paper - Abstract |
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Author’s Abstract
Sections
Comment:
Part 3: Personal Identity: Chapter 10
Write-up6 (as at 01/12/2019 15:43:12): Parfit - What We Believe Ourselves To Be
This write-up is a review of "Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be".
Abstract: Discusses numerical identity7, or being one and the same, qualitative identity, or being exactly similar, personal identity, or what is involved in our continued existence over time. According to the Physical Criterion, our identity over time consists in the continued existence of enough of our brain. According to the Psychological Criterion, our identity consists in overlapping chains of psychological continuity and connectedness. The chapter discusses how we are inclined to believe that, even in purely imagined cases, our identity must be determinate. When we ask – Would I still exist? Would that future person be me? it seems that it must always have an answer.
Sections
75. Simple Teletransportation and the Branch-Line Case
76. Qualitative and Numerical identity9
77. The Physical Criterion of Personal Identity
78. The Psychological Criterion
79. The Other Views
… Further details to be supplied10
In-Page Footnotes
Footnote 6:
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