Personal Identity and Rationality
Parfit (Derek)
Source: Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 307-321(15).
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Examines whether, if a reductionist1 view is true, we have any reason for special concern about our own future and gives extreme and moderate answers.
  2. It offers an argument against the Classical Self-interest Theory, defending a discount rate, not with respect to time itself, but with respect to the degree of psychological connectedness between ourselves now and ourselves at different future times.
  3. It also presents the immorality of imprudence.

Comment:

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