Personal Identity and Morality
Parfit (Derek)
Source: Parfit - Reasons and Persons, January 1986, pp. 321-349(29).
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Discusses Autonomy and Paternalism; becoming and ceasing to be a person, or human being; whether reductionism1 about persons undermines desert.
  2. It examines personal identity and commitments; the separateness of persons and principles of distributive justice – whether we should extend the scope of these principles, and give them less weight, whether the units for distributive principles should be lives, successive selves, or people at times, and how a reductionist2 view gives some support to the utilitarian rejection of distributive principles.


Part 3: Personal Identity: Chapter 15

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