Extract from Overview1
- In the final chapter, I undertake an appreciation of our actual values. Because you are pretty normal, among your strongest (broad ego-centric) values are these: Certain particular people-you yourself, your lover, your children- should lead long and pleasant lives of a certain complex character. In your life, you should have close personal (developing) relations with these people, not changing (mid-stream) to precisely similar relations with precise duplicates2 of them. Further, and as is pretty obvious, you should have pleasant and interesting conscious experience. Less obvious, this experience should not just happen to give you an accurate idea of what is actually going on between you and your loved ones. Rather, much of this conscious experience should be experience of those people, and experience of your intentional behavior with regard to them, and experience of the effects of your actions upon them, and experience of their resulting behavior toward you, and so on.
- For these values to be fulfilled, it is argued, there must hold, between the active lives in the world and your own conscious experience, the "right sorts" of causal relations. Now, while we'll allow some slack about which causes count as being of the right sorts, still, as further arguments show, we're pretty inflexible in this regard. By contrast, and as still further reasoning shows, we don't require that sublime metaphysical ideas be satisfied: Quite rightly, we regard these strong values as very well fulfilled even if the world should be wholly deterministic - with no transcendental free will, and, more to the main topic, even if the world should be fully physical - with no immaterial souls.
- The Phenomenalism and the Verificationism of Values: The Ego-centric Form – 298
- The Universal Form of These Views – 302
- The Value of Experience of External Reality – 305
- The Rationality of This Value – 312
- The Value of Particular People and of Relations with Them – 315
- Two Forms of Flexibilism – 319
- An Inflexible Aspect of Our Norms for Our Lives and for Our Personal Relations – 323
- Two Extreme Claims – 326
- These Extreme Claims and Three Demanding Views – 330
- The Extreme Doctrine and Norms for Our Action – 333
Footnote 1: Taken from "Unger (Peter) - Precis of 'Identity, Consciousness and Value'".
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