Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity
Van Inwagen (Peter)
Source: Van Inwagen - Ontology, Identity and Modality, Part II: Identity, Chapter 9
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Author’s Introduction

  1. I am going to argue that a materialist should not accept a psychological continuity1 theory of personal identity across time.
  2. I will begin by arguing that a materialist cannot consistently admit the possibility of a certain kind of case beloved of the proponents of psychological-continuity theories, so-called bodily transfer cases, and then attempt to generalize the essential point of the argument for this conclusion to show that a materialist should not accept a psychological continuity2 account of personal identity.


Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 11, Mind, Causation3, and World (1997), pp. 305-319

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Feb 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page