Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity
Van Inwagen (Peter)
Source: Van Inwagen - Ontology, Identity and Modality, Part II: Identity, Chapter 9
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. I am going to argue that a materialist should not accept a psychological continuity theory of personal identity across time.
  2. I will begin by arguing that a materialist cannot consistently admit the possibility of a certain kind of case beloved of the proponents of psychological-continuity theories, so-called bodily transfer cases, and then attempt to generalize the essential point of the argument for this conclusion to show that a materialist should not accept a psychological continuity account of personal identity.

Comment:

Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 11, Mind, Causation, and World (1997), pp. 305-319

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