The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 7
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryNotes Citing this PaperLink to Latest Write-Up Note


Oxford Scholarship Online Abstract

    Defends the coherence of the general idea of constitution (without identity) from a number of published criticisms. Here are two examples. First is the criticism that two things consisting of the same atoms (e.g., a statue and a piece of bronze) cannot differ in kind; this criticism is answered by a discussion of essential properties. Second is the criticism from counting: that if x is spatially coincident with y, and x not= y, and x is a statue and y is a statue, then where x is there are two statues. The second criticism is answered by a discussion of the distinction between having a property derivatively and having a property nonderivatively. Also, Chapter 7 discusses criticisms stemming from mereology and supervenience1.
Sections
  1. Constitution and Incoherence
  2. Constitution and Mereology
  3. Constitution and Supervenience2
  4. Conclusion


Write-up3 (as at 11/04/2018 12:18:43): Baker - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution

This note controls my detailed review of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Coherence Of the Idea of Material Constitution", Chapter 7 of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View". I’ve pirated the Oxford Scholarship Online summaries as a temporary expedient.

OSO Note:
… Further details to be supplied6


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3:

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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