In Favour Of the Constitution View
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Baker (Lynne) - Persons and Bodies, Chapter 9
Paper - Abstract

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Oxford Scholarship Online

  1. Concludes the book with reasons to accept the Constitution View1. It really is a materialistic view. It can accomplish almost everything that a dualist wants without the burden of dualism. It takes persons seriously in a specified sense: Being a person is relevant to the fundamental kind of individual that one is; elimination of any person would be elimination of an individual; having mental states is relevant to what a person is. No other materialist view takes persons seriously in all three of these respects.
  2. The Constitution View2 explains how it is that, although we are set apart by our first-person perspectives, we are still animals. Hence, the Constitution View3 locates human persons in the material world. The general idea of constitution (without identity) allows for a metaphysics that is both materialistic and nonreductive. This general conception of constitution supports an ontological pluralism that honors the genuine variety of kinds of individuals in the world.
Contents
  1. Yes, Materialism
  2. Dualism and its Desiderata
  3. Taking Persons Seriously4
  4. Materialistic Competitors
  5. Conclusion


Write-up5 (as at 12/10/2018 10:10:34): Baker - In Favour Of the Constitution View

This note controls my detailed review of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - In Favour Of the Constitution View", Chapter 9 of "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View". I’ve pirated the Oxford Scholarship Online summary as a temporary expedient.

Oxford Scholarship Online
  1. Concludes the book with reasons to accept the Constitution View. It really is a materialistic view. It can accomplish almost everything that a dualist wants without the burden of dualism. It takes persons seriously in a specified sense: Being a person is relevant to the fundamental kind of individual that one is; elimination of any person would be elimination of an individual; having mental states is relevant to what a person is. No other materialist view takes persons seriously in all three of these respects.
  2. The Constitution View explains how it is that, although we are set apart by our first-person perspectives, we are still animals. Hence, the Constitution View locates human persons in the material world. The general idea of constitution (without identity) allows for a metaphysics that is both materialistic and nonreductive. This general conception of constitution supports an ontological pluralism that honors the genuine variety of kinds of individuals in the world.
Contents
  1. Yes, Materialism
  2. Dualism and its Desiderata
  3. Taking Persons Seriously6
  4. Materialistic Competitors
  5. Conclusion


… Further details to be supplied7


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 5:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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