|Source: Martin - Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to what Matters in Survival, Chapter 2|
|Paper - Abstract|
- Three Theories
- Eight Objections2 (and Replies)
- Objection 1: It is a conceptual truth that people can anticipate having only their own future experiences.
- Objection 2: Necessarily when people anticipate having their own future experiences, they anticipate their having them …
- Objection 3: The idea that someone might rationally anticipate having someone else’s experience is self-refuting.
- Objection 4: The tie between the anticipation of having an experience and identity is so central to ordinary ways of anticipating having an experience that any departure from this constraint would guarantee that the anomalous anticipation would be radically different.
- Objection 5: Anticipation looks toward the future. It is the analogue of memory, which looks toward the past. In both cases we have to assume the persons remembering / anticipating are the same as those who had / will have the experiences.
- Objection 6: Anticipating having experiences that only someone else will have would lead inevitably to inappropriate emotions and feelings of responsibility …
- Objection 7: Anticipating having experiences that only someone else will have would lead inevitably to dysfunctional and, therefore, irrational behaviour …
- Objection 8: Rejecting the common-sense restriction on rational anticipation puts one on a slippery slope which leads inexorably to the result that one could rationally anticipate anyone’s, or even everyone’s, subsequent experiences.
- Why Anticipating Having is So Important
Footnote 2: To the proposal that a person could rationally anticipate having experiences that only someone else will have (which is RM’s proposal).
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