Wittgenstein on 'I'
Garrett (Brian)
Source: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 8
Paper - Abstract

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Sections

  1. Introduction
    • Self-consciousness1: Five claims
      1. There are two different uses of the pronoun ‘I’. ‘The use as object’ and ‘the use as subject’.
      2. Given Wittgenstein2’s examples, we are evidently meant to infer that ‘as subject’ uses feature only in mental self-ascriptions.
      3. All and only ‘as object’ uses ‘involve the recognition of a particular person’.
      4. Only in such cases has ‘the possibility of an error been provided for’, viz. the error of mistaking another person for myself.
      5. It is a misreading of the ‘grammar’ of ‘as subject’ uses of ‘I’ which fuels the illusion of a Cartesian subject.
    • The tension between (ii) and (iii)
    • The tension between (ii) and (iv)
  2. Wittgenstein3 and the ‘as Subject’ use of ‘I’
  3. Running Repairs to the ‘as Subject’ / ‘as Object’ Distinction
    • A New Definition
      → A Possible Tension?
  4. The Status of the ‘as Subject’ Use
    • The ‘as Subject’ Use is more Basic than the ‘as Object’ Use
    • Self-consciousness4 and the ‘as Subject’ Use of ‘I’
  5. Interpreting Wittgenstein5 on Avowals
    • Reference
    • Knowledge
    • Authority
  6. Conclusion

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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