Strawson (Peter)
Source: Strawson - Individuals, Chapter 3
Paper - Abstract

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  1. Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything? And why to the same thing as corporeal characteristics? – 87
  2. The unique position of the personal body in perceptual experience described; but this does not answer these questions. 90
  3. Cartesian and ‘No-ownership' views. The incoherence of the No-ownership view. – 94
  4. A condition of the ascription of states of consciousness to oneself is ability to ascribe them to others. The incoherence of the Cartesian view. The primitiveness of the concept of a person. – 98
  5. The logical character of a fundamental class of personal predicates. – 103
  6. The central importance of predicates ascribing actions. The idea of a ‘group mind'. – 110
  7. Disembodiment. – 115


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