Identity: Introduction
Ayers (Michael R.)
Source: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Introduction to Part III, pp. 205-206
Paper - Abstract

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  1. Possibility of immortality, but no need for immortality of the soul.
  2. No immediate consciousness of Cartesian substance; unity of consciousness1 only a phenomenal unity2.
  3. First and Second editions of the Essay contradict.
    • In the first edition, “I” can survive transmutation – can persist through change of colour, shape and loss of reason or even life.
    • In the second edition, life constitutes the animal and consciousness constitutes the self. Maybe at death the individual goes out of existence.
  4. Both editions resist Aristotelian forms.


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