Sensations and Brain-Events
Swinburne (Richard)
Source: The Evolution of the Soul, February 1997, Chapter 3, pp. 45-62(18).
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. If we are to give a full history of the world, we need to count two properties as distinct, if possession of one does not entail possession of the other.
  2. Hence, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and so mental events including sensations are distinct from physical events.
  3. So functionalism is rejected.
  4. And (New Appendix A shows) mental events do not supervene1 on, are not constituted by, or realized in, physical events.

Comment:

See "Smart (J.C.C.) - Sensations and Brain Processes" for a contrasting view.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
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