<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Loux (Michael) - The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4169.htm">The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/L/Author_Loux (Michael).htm">Loux (Michael)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Loux - Metaphysics - A Contemporary Introduction, 2002, Chapter 1</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4169.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PapersToNotes_4169.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Overview</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The phenomenon of similarity or attribute agreement gives rise to the debate between realists and nominalists. Realists claim that where objects are similar or agree in attribute, there is some one thing that they share or have in common; nominalists deny this. Realists call these shared entities <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>: they say that <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> are entities that can be simultaneously exemplified by several different objects; and they claim that <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP> encompass the properties things possess, the relations into which they enter, and the kinds to which they belong. </li><li>Toward showing us that we must endorse the reality of <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>4</SUP>, realists point to the phenomena of subject predicate discourse and abstract reference. They claim that unless we posit <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>5</SUP> as the referents of predicate expressions, we cannot explain how subject predicate sentences can be true, and they argue that we can explain the truth of sentences incorporating abstract referring terms only if we take <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>6</SUP> to be the things identified by the use of those terms. </li><li>Realists, however, frequently disagree about the generality of their accounts of predication and abstract reference. Some realists, for example, deny that their account of predication holds for sentences incorporating the term 'exemplifies.' Other realists insist that their account holds only for primitive or undefined predicates or abstract terms. Furthermore, some realists hold that there are <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>7</SUP> corresponding only to predicates that are actually true of existing objects; whereas other realists believe that there are both exemplified and unexemplifled properties, kinds, and relations. </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Realism and nominalism</li><li>The ontology of metaphysical realism</li><li>Realism and predication</li><li>Realism and abstract reference</li><li>Restrictions on realism  exemplification</li><li>Further restrictions  defined and undefined predicates</li><li>Are there any unexemplified attributes? </li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:17" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:17:22</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>