Semantic Innocence and Psychological Understanding
Hornsby (Jennifer)
Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The paper attempts to dislodge the idea that accounts of propositional attitude explanation can be separated from accounts of sentential content (or meaning). The claim is that by seeing how a theory of truth can serve as a theory of sense, one sees the errors of methodological solipsism, and can provide an alternative philosophical understanding of psychological understanding.

Comment:

Part III - Mind, Causation1 and Explanation; Chapter 12

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