|Will I Be a Dead Person?|
|Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Mar99, Vol. 59 Issue 1, p167, 5p;|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Summary||Notes Citing this Paper|
Philosophers Index Abstract
Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the standard view of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olsen's favored biological view of personal identity.Author’s Abstract
Focuses on the argument focusing on dead people which opposes Eric Olson's Biological View of personal identity.
… Rejection of the identity claim that raises the fetal problem;
… Analysis of the Biological View and standard view of personal identity;
… Eliminativist position of corpses in regard to their biological and psychological activity.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
|© Theo Todman, June 2007 - February 2018.||Please address any comments on this page to firstname.lastname@example.org.||File output: |
Website Maintenance Dashboard
|Return to Top of this Page||Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page||Return to Theo Todman's Home Page|