Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects
Elder (Crawford)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58.2, June 1998, pp. 317-331
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    How can a parcel of matter, or collection of particles, simultaneously compose three different objects, characterized by different modal1 properties? If the statue2 is gouged it still exists, but not exactly that piece of gold which originally occupied the statue3's borders, and the (mass of) gold within that piece can survive dispersal, while the piece cannot. The solution to this "problem of coinciding objects", this paper argues, is that there is, in that space, only the statue4. The properties which the piece and the mass supposedly must have, to go on being, are not properties which anything can have necessarily or essentially. Not even having that origin can be essential. There is no object of which the statue5 is composed, though there are objects (viz., gold atoms) and a kind of stuff (viz., gold) of which it is composed.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - July 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page