Sameness and Individuation
Gabbay (Dov M.) & Moravcsik (Julius)
Source: Journal of Philosophy, Sept 1973; 70:16, 513-526
Paper - Abstract

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Authors’ Introduction

  1. Is 'same' always used in the same sense? Do the truth conditions of statements of the form 'x is the same as y' remain constant throughout the variety of uses in which they may be embedded? These questions have been worrying linguists and logicians for some time.
  2. This paper is designed as a modest attempt toward the clarification of these issues. Its main claim is that we must distinguish the concepts of identity, persistence through time, and individuation: concepts which are interwoven in a variety of ways in our uses of 'same'.
  3. On the basis of these distinctions a rigorous semantics can be developed that clarifies the meanings of a number of key phrases in natural languages like English. It should also aid those who probe the depths of certain metaphysical and logical problems concerning identity.

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