Divided Minds
Hirsch (Eli)
Source: Philosophical Review 100, 1991
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The author distinguishes between the "unity of consciousness" and the "unity of self-reflexiveness." The former is lost in cases of split brains but the author argues that the latter is not lost. Because Parfit1 tacitly assumes that the latter is lost, he erroneously supposes that split brain patients can exercise selective knowledge and control in each of their streams of consciousness.

Comment:

Also in "Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Personal Identity (Readings)".

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