Persistence, Parts and Presentism
Merricks (Trenton)
Source: Nous 33.3, Sept. 1999, 421-438
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Enduring objects are standardly described as being "wholly present," being three dimensional, and lacking temporal parts.
  2. Perduring objects are standardly described as being "spread out in time," being four-dimensional, and having temporal parts.
  3. I shall defend novel but intuitively satisfying accounts of both endurance and perdurance. Rejecting the accounts I defend, I shall argue, would undermine the standard ways of describing enduring and perduring objects.
  4. The standard descriptions can, in fact, be more clearly understood-and can all be shown to flow from a single characterization of the endurance / perdurance controversy once we accept my accounts of endurance and perdurance.
  5. And once we accept the account of endurance that I defend, we can see that endurance – or at least the existence of enduring objects that can possibly undergo change of parts – implies presentism, a doctrine about the nature of time.

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