Philosophers Index Abstract
- This paper argues that if persons last over time by "enduring", then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in terms of any sort of psychological continuity1 can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in terms of psychological continuity2 entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts.
- The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyzes of personal identity – as we must if persons endure – Parfit's argument for the claim that identity does not matter in survival is easily undermined.
- The paper then suggests that this offers support for the claim that persons endure. Along the way the paper tries to clarify the contrast between the doctrine that persons endure and its rival, four-dimensionalism.
- Argues on the irrelevance of any analysis in terms of psychological continuity4 or reduction of personal identity if persons last over time due to endurance.
- Derek Parfit's argument against the claim that identity does not matter in survival;
- Contrast between the doctrine that persons endure and its rival, four dimensionalism.
Footnote 3: I’ve forgotten where this is from, not that it’s very useful, given the PI one.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)