<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Brown (Jessica) - Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4341.htm">Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Brown (Jessica).htm">Brown (Jessica)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Mind - 107/426 (April 1998)</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4341.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PapersToNotes_4341.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>1</SUP> in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. </li><li>The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by <a name="14"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/K/Author_Kripke (Saul).htm">Saul Kripke</A> and by <a name="15"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Putnam (Hilary).htm">Hilary Putnam</A>. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that <ol type="i"><li>typically, an item that instantiates one <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>2</SUP> instantiates several - "the higher-level <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>3</SUP> problem"; and </li><li><a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>4</SUP> often occur in nature in impure form - "the composition problem". </ol>(edited) </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Ingenta Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>5</SUP> in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that <ol type="i"><li>typically, an item that instantiates one <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>6</SUP> instantiates several - 'the higher-level <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>7</SUP> problem', and </li><li><a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>8</SUP> often occur in nature in impure form - 'the composition problem'. </ol></li><li>On the account I propose, a term for a <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>9</SUP> gains its reference by being associated with a recognitional capacity for that kind. I show how members of a scientifically ignorant community could have a recognitional capacity for a <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>10</SUP>, say gold, as opposed to a certain kind of appearance, for instance the appearance that gold actually has. I argue that members of such a community can have recognitional capacities for particular <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>11</SUP> despite the actual or possible existence of duplicate kinds, e.g. water. After developing the account in detail, I show how it can deal with the two problems faced by Kripke's and Putnam's problem.</li><li>The case of <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>12</SUP> terms is crucial to the central debate in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind about whether we can refer non-descriptively to objects and kinds in the world. I take the account I propose to be a non-descriptive account of linguistic reference to <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>13</SUP> that can be used to support externalism in the philosophy of mind.</li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:19" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:19:24</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>