Presentism and Ontological Commitment
Sider (Ted)
Source: Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this Paper


Philosophers Index Abstract

    We often find ourselves quantifying over entities we do not really accept. Example: presentists reject past and future entities, yet quantify over them in unreflective moments. Paraphrasing away the unwanted commitments does not always work. When it does not, presentists should give up on paraphrase and admit that the talk is untrue. It may nevertheless be quasi-true, if (roughly) there are actual facts on which the talk would have supervened1 had presentism been false. Whether quasi-truth can indeed be secured depends on certain assumptions, which are examined. The strategy is then applied to other cases of apparent ontological commitment to problematic entities.

Comment:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - April 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page