Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic
Hawley (Katherine)
Source: Mind, 107, Number 428, October 1998, pp. 841-843
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The paper is a response to "Merricks (Trenton) - Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience" Mind, 107, 1998, pp. 59-71. Merricks denies that the existence and intrinsic properties of things supervene upon the intrinsic properties of their microphysical parts and relations between those parts. He claims that the property being conscious is an intrinsic property of people although it does not supervene upon the microphysical basis. I argue, in response, that being conscious is not an intrinsic property of people. Something intrinsically exactly like me as I am now, but attached to an extra toe, would not1 be conscious. So Merricks has not discovered a counterexample to the doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience.


In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: This looks highly unlikely to me. See my copious annotations on this paper, Merrick’s original paper, and Merrick’s response to Hawley ("Merricks (Trenton) - On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic"). Sadly, I’ve not yet had time to put these on-line.

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