Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience
Merricks (Trenton)
Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience1 (MS) states that: Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative properties Q1, through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources to show that Global Microphysical Supervenience2 (GMS) is false. GMS states that possible worlds qualitatively exactly alike at the microphysical level are qualitatively exactly alike at the macrophysical level.


See "Hawley (Katherine) - Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic" and "Merricks (Trenton) - On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic". Annotated printout in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 11 (M2: Me+)".

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