|The Unity of the Fact|
|Source: Philosophy - 80, Jul2005, Issue 313, p317-342, 16p, 1 graph|
|Paper - Abstract|
Philosophers Index Abstract
What binds the constituents of a fact together and provides unity? I argue that the fact that they are related is basic. This is factualism: the world is one of facts. I draw three corollaries: first, the identity theory of truth is mistaken, in conflating what represents with what is represented. Secondly, an interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, whereby false propositions picture nonexistent state of affairs, cannot be right. Finally, the metaphysics of modal1 realism must be wrong, for there are no nonactual states of affairs to constitute worlds other than the actual world.
(Author): Asserts that the claim that the problem of unity of the fact is that of reconstituting the fact from its constituents once they have been abstracted from it, is misconceived. Argument that it is the way the problem is described and conceived which is the problem; Reasons why truth is a substantial and external property; Ways by which the Leibnizian strategy destroys the unity of the fact.
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