Almog's Descartes
Ablondi (Fred)
Source: Philosophy - 80, Jul2005, Issue 313, p423-431, 9p
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The answer which Joseph Almog gives to the question which serves as the title of his book What Am I1?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem is based upon his interpretation of (1) an objection to Descartes's argument for the mind-body distinction raised by Arnauld, as well as Descartes's response to it, and (2) Descartes's letter to Mesland. I argue that both of these interpretations are incorrect, and as such do not support the conclusions which Almog claims to draw from them; Almog's answer to the question is not one Descartes would have held, nor one which his writings support.

    (???): Argues that Joseph Almog's interpretations of Rene Descartes' thesis that the mind and body are substances that can exist without each other, are wrong. Weakness of Almog's argument that the generic conception of body, when coupled with a generic conception of mind, will not allow for endurance; Assertion that Descartes is not giving an either/or, instead, his point is that whether or not we are correct in claiming that we have the same body before us depends on the concerns we have.

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