Vagueness and 'Vague': Rejoinder to Hull
Varzi (Achille)
Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 695-702(8)
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. A rejoinder to G. Hull’s reply1 to my Mind 20032.
  2. Hull argues that Sorensen’s purported proof that ‘vague’ is vague – which I defended against certain familiar objections – fails. He offers three reasons:
    1. the vagueness exhibited by Sorensen’s sorites3 is just the vagueness of ‘small’;
    2. the general assumption underlying the proof, to the effect that predicates which possess borderline cases are vague, is mistaken;
    3. the conclusion of the proof is unacceptable, for it is possible to create Sorensen-type sorites4 even for predicates that are paradigmatically precise.
  3. I argue that each of these points involves fallacious reasoning.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: See "Hull (Gerald) - Vagueness and 'Vague': A Reply to Varzi".

Footnote 2: See "Varzi (Achille) - Higher-Order Vagueness and the Vagueness of 'Vague'".


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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