Persistence and Substance
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics, 2001, Chapter 5
Paper - Abstract

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OUP Abstract

  1. Argues that the very existence of time — and, more particularly, the temporal unity of the world as one world in time — is dependent upon the existence of concrete individual substances persisting through time, with the consequence that persisting substances cannot coherently be conceived to be mere sequences or aggregates of successively existing entities, their supposed 'temporal parts'.
  2. An argument due to David Lewis being in favour of the latter view, appealing to the so-called problem of intrinsic change, is criticized for failing to recognize a solution to this problem, which distinguishes between temporal and atemporal modes of property exemplification.

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