Matter and Form
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics, 2001, Chapter 9
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


OUP Abstract

  1. Here, attention is drawn to the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, a version of which is defended in providing an account of the nature of composite substances.
  2. It is argued that a composite substance cannot be identified with the mereological sum of its component parts, nor with a bundle of compresent 'tropes' or property instances.
  3. A 'four-category ontology', inspired by Aristotle, is defended, according to which four fundamental and mutually irreducible categories of entity need to be acknowledged: substantial particulars, non-substantial particulars (or 'modes'), substantial universals1, and non-substantial universals2.

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