The Impossibility of Zombies
Papineau (David)
Source: Papineau - Thinking About Consciousness, Chapter 3
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Chapter 3 begins with Kripke's modal1 argument against materialism.
  2. In the first instance I simply aim to analyse this argument, and to show that there is a way for the materialist to defuse it.
  3. But in the course of this analysis a further feature of phenomenal concepts emerges: if materialism is true, then phenomenal concepts must refer directly, and not by invoking any contingent features of their referents.

Sections
  1. Introduction - 75
  2. Epistemology versus Metaphysics - 77
  3. The Appearance of Contingency - 77
  4. Explaining the Appearance of Contingency - 79
  5. Referring via Contingent Properties - 81
  6. A Different Explanation - 85
  7. Thinking Impossible Things - 88
  8. Conceivability and Possibility - 91
  9. The Intuition of Distinctness – 93

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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