<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Papineau (David) - The Impossibility of Zombies (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4604.htm">The Impossibility of Zombies</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Papineau (David).htm">Papineau (David)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Papineau - Thinking About Consciousness, Chapter 3</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4604.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PapersToNotes_4604.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Abstract</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Chapter 3 begins with Kripke's <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>1</SUP> argument against materialism. </li><li>In the first instance I simply aim to analyse this argument, and to show that there is a way for the materialist to defuse it. </li><li>But in the course of this analysis a further feature of phenomenal concepts emerges: if materialism is true, then phenomenal concepts must refer directly, and not by invoking any contingent features of their referents.</li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction - 75</li><li>Epistemology versus Metaphysics - 77</li><li>The Appearance of Contingency - 77</li><li>Explaining the Appearance of Contingency - 79</li><li>Referring via Contingent Properties - 81</li><li>A Different Explanation - 85</li><li>Thinking Impossible Things - 88</li><li>Conceivability and Possibility - 91</li><li>The Intuition of Distinctness  93</li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:12" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:12:31</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>