Intentionalism Defended
Byrne (Alex)
Source: Philosophical Review 110.2, April 2001, 199-240
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The basic claim of intentionalism (also called 'representationalism') is that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes1 on its representational content. The paper explains the various versions of intentionalism, argues for the strongest of these versions, and defends the conclusion over a number of objections, including those due to Block and Peacocke.

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