Parfit on Persons
Cassam (Quassim)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 17-37, 1992
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. It is argued that Parfit1's claim that personal identity is not what matters2 depends for much of its plausibility on the assumption that persons3 are not substances4, on either a realist or conceptualist view of substance.
  2. It is suggested that the main challenge facing Parfit5 is to explain why thinking of ourselves as non-substantial is better than the best non-reductionist6 conception of ourselves, namely, animalism7.

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