Parfit on Persons
Cassam (Quassim)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 17-37, 1992
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryNotes Citing this Paper

Philosophers Index Abstract

    It is argued that Parfit's claim that personal identity is not what matters1 depends for much of its plausibility on the assumption that persons are not substances, on either a realist or conceptualist view of substance. It is suggested that the main challenge facing Parfit is to explain why thinking of ourselves as non-substantial is better than the best non-reductionist conception of ourselves, namely, animalism2.

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