Philosophers Index Abstract
- Four-dimensionalism is a view about the ontological status of nonpresent objects.
- Presentists say that only present objects exist.
- Four-dimensionalists reject presentism, maintaining that, in addition to present objects, there are also merely past or merely future objects (or both).
- This essay provides a critical overview of the most important arguments in support of four dimensionalism.
- This Abstract appears to misrepresent Four-dimensionalism. Or is it OK as far as it goes, but would misrepresent Perdurantism1?
- Rea’s introduction points out the distinction between the use of the term in his article, as the antithesis of presentism, and its use for perdurantism and the like.
- Whereas Four-dimensionalism does seem to deny presentism, in that it claims that non-present temporal parts exist, it claims further that objects are not wholly present at a time, but consist in an aggregate of these temporal parts – as a space-time worm.
- But – again – maybe this is only Perdurantism? Exdurantism2 has a counterpart relation between time-slices to explain persistence. I don’t know what its stand has to be about the ontological status of non-present slices.
For the full text, see Rea - Four Dimensionalism.
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