- The "conceivability argument" for dualism is presented and analyzed in depth.
- It is argued that in order to derive the possibility of zombies - creatures physically like us but without conscious experience - from their conceivability, certain unwarranted semantic and epistemic doctrines must be accepted.
- By introducing the idea of a nonascriptive mode of presentation, it is argued that a materialist can consistently allow the conceivability of zombies without admitting their metaphysical possibility.
- Some Preliminaries
- The Conceivability Argument
- 3.1 A Digression about Realization and Identity
- 3.2 Back to the Argument
- Various Kinds of Response to the Conceivability Argument
- The NE-Type Response (“Non-Exceptionalists”)
- Strong Metaphysical Necessity
- Ascriptivist Arguments and Replies
- 7.1 The Argument from Knowledge of Identity
- 7.1 The Argument from Explanation
- Ascriptivist Responses
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)