The Conceivability Argument: 'Lately Things Don't Seem the Same'
Levine (Joseph)
Source: Levine - Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, 2001, Chapter 2
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsColour-ConventionsDisclaimer


Author’s Abstract

  1. The "conceivability argument" for dualism is presented and analyzed in depth.
  2. It is argued that in order to derive the possibility of zombies - creatures physically like us but without conscious experience - from their conceivability, certain unwarranted semantic and epistemic doctrines must be accepted.
  3. By introducing the idea of a nonascriptive mode of presentation, it is argued that a materialist can consistently allow the conceivability of zombies without admitting their metaphysical possibility.

Sections
  1. Introduction
  2. Some Preliminaries
  3. The Conceivability Argument
    • 3.1 A Digression about Realization and Identity
    • 3.2 Back to the Argument
  4. Various Kinds of Response to the Conceivability Argument
  5. The NE-Type Response (“Non-Exceptionalists”)
  6. Strong Metaphysical Necessity
  7. Ascriptivist Arguments and Replies
    • 7.1 The Argument from Knowledge of Identity
    • 7.1 The Argument from Explanation
  8. Ascriptivist Responses
  9. Conclusion

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page