- 62: Philosophy is not a search for first principles.
- 62: Barrenness of Descartes' procedure.
- 65: The function of philosophy is wholly critical. But this does not mean that it can give an a priori justification of our scientific or common-sense assumptions.
- 66: There is no genuine problem of induction, as ordinarily conceived.
- 68: Philosophising is an activity of analysis.
- 69: Most of those who are commonly thought to have been great philosophers were philosophers in our sense, rather than metaphysicians.
- 70: Locke, Berkeley, Hume as analysts.
- 71: We adopt Berkeley's phenomenalism without his theism.
- 72: And take a Humean view of causation2.
- 75: Philosophy in our sense is wholly independent of metaphysics. We are not committed to any doctrine of atomism.
- 76: The philosopher as an analyst is not concerned with the physical properties of things, but only with the way in which we speak about them.
- 77: Linguistic propositions disguised in factual terminology.
- 78: Philosophy issues in definitions.
Footnote 1: These headings were helpfully supplied by Ayer on pp. 37-40 of the 1971 Pelican edition. The numbers refer to the pages in that edition.
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