- 176: The nature of philosophy does not warrant the existence of conflicting philosophical 'parties'.
- 177: The conflict between rationalists and empiricists.
- 179: Our own logical empiricism to be distinguished from positivism.
- 180: We reject Hume's psychological, as opposed to his logical, doctrines.
- 182: Realism and Idealism.
- 183: To say that a thing exists is not to say that it is actually being perceived.
- 186: Things as permanent possibilities of sensation.
- 187: What is perceived is not necessarily mental.
- 190: What exists need not necessarily be thought of.
- 190: Nor what is thought of exist.
- 191: Empirical grounds for supposing that things may exist unperceived.
- 193: Monism and Pluralism.
- 193: Monistic fallacy that all a thing's properties are constitutive of is nature.
- 196: Illustrates the danger of expressing linguistic propositions in factual terminology.
- 197: Causality2 not a logical relation.
- 199: Empirical evidence against the monist's view that every event is causally connected with every other.
- 200: The unity of science.
- 200: Philosophy as the logic of science.
Footnote 1: These headings were helpfully supplied by Ayer on pp. 37-40 of the 1971 Pelican edition. The numbers refer to the pages in that edition.
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