Colour, Consciousness, and Colour Consciousness
McLaughlin (Brian)
Source: Smith & Jokic - Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryText Colour-Conventions


Author’s Introduction


Contents
  1. Revelation
  2. Colours v. What It’s Like to See Them
  3. A Functional Analysis of Colour
  4. Our Functional Analysis v. Dispositionalism
  5. Will the Circle be Broken?
  6. Might Redness Not Have Been Redness?
  7. The Role of Vision Science
  8. Relations Amongst the Colours
  9. Colour Space and the Phenomenal Character of Colour Experiences
  10. The Problem of Standard Variation
  11. A Relativist Response to the Problem of Standard Variation
  12. The Problem of Common Ground and the Problem of Multiple Grounds
  13. A Promising Strategy for Solving the Problem of Common Ground
  14. On the Possibility of a Certain Kind of Phenomenal Character Inversion
  15. Intentionalism
  16. Colour and Tye’s and Dretske’s Wide Strong Denotational-Intentionalism
  17. Tye’s and Dretske’s Commitment to Colour Absolutism
  18. Phenomenal Characters, Subjectivity, and Direct Acquaintance
    … Red Mary
    … Water and H2O

Comment:

Part One: Intentionality and Phenomenal Content, Chapter 5

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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