<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Wiggins (David) - Identity, Necessity and Physicalism (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4925.htm">Identity, Necessity and Physicalism</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">Wiggins (David)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Stephan Korner (ed.) Philosophy of Logic, Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, pp. 96-132</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4925.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperCitings_4925.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PapersToNotes_4925.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P4925_1">Author s Introduction</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P4925_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>When metaphysical importance is plausibly ascribed to a result in formal logic this is an exciting, not to say stirring, event. In part, this is because visible progress is something not unknown in formal logic, whereas in philosophy  well, some people wonder how much progress there is. My own view is both that there is progress in philosophy, and that formal logic has had at least a little to do with the progress, but it is not always a straightforward matter to read the right philosophical significance into formal results. They serve as nothing else can to destroy nonsense but, beyond that, even theorems may in application provoke controversy. All the same, <em>pace</em> one school of thought, it seems to me that such controversy is almost always metaphysically fruitful and philosophically innovative.</li><li>This paper is to consider one claim of this kind, namely Saul Kripke's contention that the <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>2</SUP> theorem (a = b) &sup; &square; (a = b) excludes philosophical materialism. It would be ungracious for me to begin a paper which is at least at two points quite critical of Kripke without saying that I believe Kripke is right to hold that the theorem bears upon the mind-body problem (even if it is no help to Kripke's Cartesianism): and that I yield to none in my admiration of the wit, invention and integrity of philosophical purpose which shine through Kripke's writings on these subjects. </li><li>At risk of repeating what may be very familiar I shall start with a summary of Kripke's position in <a name="2"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1989.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity</A>". </li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>See:-<BR>&rarr; <a name="3"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4928.htm">Hacking (Ian) - Comments on Wiggins - Identity, Necessity and Physicalism</A>", and<BR>&rarr; <a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4927.htm">Marcus (Ruth Barcan) - Comments on Wiggins - Identity, Necessity and Physicalism</A>"<BR>for responses. </li></ul><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P4925_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P4925_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">An earlier and in certain important respects substantially different version of this contribution was published in Philosophia for January 1975 under the title 'Identity, Designation, Essentialism and Physicalism'. </li><li>There is also some overlap at some points with <a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17139.htm">Wiggins (David) - Essentialism, Continuity, and Identity</A>". </li><li>For the formal development presupposed here of 'necessarily' as a predicate-operator see my 'The De Re "Must": a note on the logical form of essentialist claims' forthcoming, with an Appendix by C. A. B. Peacocke, in Semantics edited by Gareth Evans and John McDowell (Oxford University Press, 1975). </FONT> </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:15" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:15:49</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>